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Questioning Miranda
Gerald M. Caplan*
I.

INTRODUCTION

My exposure to police interrogation dates back to 1964 when,
shortly following graduation from law school, I joined the United
States Attorney's Office in the District of Columbia. Encouraged
by my supervisor, I started riding with the police on evening patrol. The precinct detectives I met were serious and hardworking,
and they demonstrated more than occasional bravery when responding to calls for assistance. Nevertheless, even if these detectives had been the "army of occupation" that some then labeled
them, their shortcomings might not have caught my eye. It was my
first look at urban crime, and I had not realized how scary it was
"out there" or how limited the police were even at their best. At
the time, I took for granted the need for police questioning of
suspects.
When I quit prosecuting in 1965 to join the staff of the newly
formed National Crime Commission, I became witness to a scorching debate that was spilling over from the Department of Justice
on the merits of the Supreme Court's recent Massiah' and Esco1985 Vanderbilt Law Review.
*Professor of Law, The George Washington University National Law Center. The reO

search for this Article was completed during the spring semester of 1984 when I was a Senior Guggenheim Fellow and Visiting Scholar at the Yale Law School. I am much indebted to
Professor Daniel Freed, the director of the Guggenheim Program. Frank Carrington, Mary
Cheh, Arthur S. Miller, Robert Park, Lloyd Weinreb, and Ernest van den Haag generously
offered their criticism. Professor Yale Kamisar kindly reviewed the section on voluntariness;
his extensive writings on the law of confessions provided a rich deposit from which I drew.
Finally, I thank Cheryl Wulf for her editorial assistance.
1. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
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bedo02 decisions expanding suspects' immunity from police interrogation.3 do not recall my own reaction-Supreme Court decisions
were not immediately felt in the District of Columbia Court of
General Sessions, or, for that matter, even read-but I do recall
4
well my disappointment two years later in 1966 when Miranda
itself was decided. Because Miranda was intended to restrict, perhaps eliminate, virtually all police interrogation, and because interrogation was understood to be not merely another evidence gathering technique, but "the method of criminal investigation, ' 5 I
agreed with Justice White who predicted in his dissent that many
criminals "will .

.

. under this new version of the Fifth Amend-

ment, either not be tried at all or will be acquitted."'
Now, after nearly twenty years, Miranda retains its celebrity
status. It is our best known criminal case. 7 Not only in name, but
in the rights it accorded to criminal suspects, it has become part of
our common awareness. But apart from this, Miranda seems to
have won acceptance, even approval, extending beyond what its
stormy past would have indicated. Although the incidence of crime
surged skyward after 1966, concern over police interrogation, both
in terms of its effectiveness and its fairness, largely vanished.
Nonetheless, in 1971 the Supreme Court in Harris v. New
York 8 refused to interpret Miranda to prevent statements taken in
violation of Miranda from being used to impeach a defendant's
credibility. Since Harris,the Supreme Court not only has avoided
other opportunities to extend Miranda but, arguably, has diluted
its principles, 9 particularly in the last two Terms. 10
2.

Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).

3. See, e.g., Kamisar, Has the Court Left the Attorney General Behind?-The
Bazelon-Katzenbach Letters on Poverty, Equality and the Administration of Criminal
Justice, 54 Ky. L.J. 464 (1966), and the spirited replies of such panelists as Richard Kuh,

Dean Edward Barrett, and Justice Walter Schaefer, id. at 499-525.
4.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

5. L. WElaRnB,

DENIAL OF JUSTICE ix

(1977); see also W.

LAFAvE, ARREST

304 (1965)

("Interrogation is the principal investigative device.").

6. 384 U.S. at 542.
7. A 1976 poll of members of the American Bar Assocation to determine "milestone
events" in American legal history gave Miranda a fourth place ranking. No other criminal
law decision finished higher. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), came in
first, and Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), came in fifth. See J. LIEBERMAN,
MILESTONES! vii (1976).
8. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
9. See Stone, The Miranda Doctrinein the Burger Court, 1977 SuP. CT. REV. 99, 118.
One commentator asserts that the Burger Court did not provide a "clear-cut victory for
Miranda" until 1981 when it decided Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (holding that in a
custodial interrogation, if a suspect indicates that he wants to remain silent, then the inter-
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This Article argues that the Supreme Court should go further
and reexamine the basic principles underlying Miranda. Although
its impact has been tamed by interpretation and practice, and although the hour is late," a case can be made for overruling Miranda. Miranda was not a wise or necessary decision, nor has Miranda proved to be, as is generally contended, 2 a harmless one. It
sent our jurisprudence on a hazardous detour by introducing novel
conceptions of the proper relationship between the suspect and authority. It accentuated just those features of our system that manifest the least regard for truthseeking, that imagine the criminal
trial as a game of chance in which the offender should always have
some prospect of victory, and that ultimately reflect doubt on the
rectitude of our laws and institutions. Beyond this, it was decided
at a time when effective alternatives for restraining unlawful police
conduct were ripe for implementation.
This Article is divided into six parts. Part II discusses historical perspectives toward interrogation and confession and explores
how Miranda may have influenced these perspectives. Part III
traces the Supreme Court's attempt to fashion a means of controlling police misconduct without substantially impairing the effectiveness of criminal investigation. The focus of this section is on
rogation must cease, and if he indicates that he wants counsel, the interrogation must cease
until counsel is present). Sonenshein, Miranda and the Burger Court: Trends and Countertrends, 13 Loy. U. CHL L.J. 405, 447 (1982).

Apart from its specific holdings, the Supreme Court's ambivalence toward Miranda is
evidenced by its declarations in support of police interrogation and the value of confession.
For example, in United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977), the Court observed
that "far from being prohibited by the Constitution, admissions of guilt by wrongdoers, if
not coerced, are inherently desirable."
10. See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985) (holding that an admission from
an unwarned suspect may nonetheless be admissible in evidence against him when the admission was uncoerced and was repeated following the giving of Miranda warnings); New
York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984) (creating a "public safety" exception to Miranda);
see also Goldberg, Escobedo and Miranda Revisited, 18 AKRON L. REv. 177, 180 (1984) (arguing that the present Court "is determined to limit or overrule Miranda by erosion").
11. Chief Justice Burger, in his concurring opinion in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S.
291, 304 (1978), stated that "at this late date" it is not necessary to "overrule" or even
"disparage" Miranda.
12. See Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the
Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 537 ("The Court's great experience with per se rules
in the Miranda case produced much less impact on actual law enforcement practices than
either the supporters or opponents of the Court's holding anticipated. . . . [C]onsiderable
empirical evidence suggests that the Miranda warnings, when given, are rarely sufficient to
overcome the 'atmosphere of coercion' in custodial interrogation, that the warnings are often
not fully understood by the arrested parties, and that a large majority of suspected persons
waive their rights to counsel and to remain silent."); see also infra note 218. For a detailed
discussion of the impact of Miranda, see infra text accompanying notes 222-41.
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the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Part IV illustrates through two cases-Gallegos v. Colorado13 and Escobedo v.
Illinois14 -the erosion of the fourteenth amendment voluntariness
test. Part V critiques Miranda. Part VI examines how police have
received and adapted to Miranda and attempts to assess the consequences. The final section makes the argument for overruling the
decision and suggests alternative ways to limit police misconduct.
II.

CHANGING ATTITUDES TOWARD INTERROGATION

A.

The Pre-MirandaPerspective

Throughout history, governments have acted to safeguard
their citizenry by seeking out those suspected of wrongdoing-revolutionaries, murderers, thieves, and other common
criminals-and asking them questions about their conduct. Asking
questions was understood not only as a reasonable way to get answers but also as the best way. Interrogation was the central
method for identifying those who threatened the general well-being and, with few exceptions, 1 5 society perceived this form of investigation as a legitimate prerogative of properly constituted
authority. 6

Confession born of interrogation was viewed as the turning
point in a criminal's life. When confession was accompanied by remorse, it marked the beginning of rehabilitation. The man who
genuinely accused himself was a changed man; he had recognized
his error; he admitted that he was at fault and not his judges. He
had impliedly endorsed the moral order, and his confession celebrated the values of honesty and sincerity.' 7 When received with
13. 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
14.

378 U.S. 478 (1964).

15. L. LEvY,

ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

314-15, 318-19 (1968).

16. Although there is not a specific provision in the Constitution that confers the
power of interrogation on the government, such power, as Thurgood Marshall observed as
Solicitor General during oral argument in Westover v. United States, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
I
(one of the companion cases to Miranda), "is inherent in the investigatory process ....
don't think it has ever been questioned." R MEDALiE, FROM ESCOBEDO TO MIRANDA THE

134 (1966); see also W. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND
SociETY 60 (1967) ("[Alsking questions is a reasonable way to get answers, and it seems to
me that the burden rests upon those who advocate an entirely accusatorial system to justify
its divergence from everyday morality and common sense.").
17. Attitudes toward confession have changed enormously. In a recent study, Professors Hepworth and Turner characterized earlier attitudes toward confession as follows:
Prior to the nineteenth century crime was not by and large seen as the product of
depressing social conditions, special circumstances, or "the criminal mind" to which
only experts had access. On the contrary, it was seen as an integral part of the plight of
ANATOMY OF A SUPREME COURT DECISION
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mercy, confession afforded the confessor a homecoming, a readmission to the community that had been, but was no longer,
offended.'
At the same time, society has long appreciated that interrogation may be linked with the unlawful use of force by the authorities. When officials believe that conduct is heinous and must be
exposed, they are tempted to ignore what John Lilburne called
"formalities, niceties, and punctilios."'19 Consequently, society always has been concerned with regulating interrogations lest they
become a test of endurance rather than veracity. Even when torture was sanctioned as a means for obtaining proof of guilt during
the middle ages in Europe, significant restrictions were imposed on
its application as a matter of law: the crime had to be capital; the
authorities had to establish a corpus delicti; there had to be substantial evidence against the suspect; and questioning could not be
suggestive.20
An early provision of the Massachusetts Bill of Rights clearly
demonstrates the historic tension between the government's obligation to protect society and its concern that it effect this protection in a decent manner. The Massachusetts Bill of Rights provided: "No man shall be forced by Torture to confess any Crime
against himself ... unless it be in some Capital case where he first

be fully convicted by clear and sufficient evidence to be guilty."'"
Then "he may be tortured, yet not with such Tortures as be Barbarous and inhumane. ' ' 22 This tension is particularly evident in

democratic governments because of the value accorded individual
autonomy and dignity.
In the United States, until recently, people felt that incommunicado detention and questioning of suspects who were lawfully arrested on probable cause were integral features of the investigative
process. Although never formalized, custodial interrogation was an
everyman. Crime was the predictable result of an understandable failure to resist
temptation to sin to which all men were prone. The role of confession in the popular
literature of murder and its punishment was to confirm the common frailties of mankind fallen from Grace.
M. HEPWORTH & B. TURNER, CONFESSION STUDIES iN DEVANCE AND RELIGION 112 (1982).
18. See, e.g., D. BONHOEFFER, THE COST OF DISCIPLESHIP (1959). The Freudian psychiatrist, Theodore Reik, described the remorseful criminal as an "outsider ... on his painful
detour back to the family of man." T. REIK, THE COMPULSION TO CONFESS 279 (1959).
19. L. LEvy, supra note 15, at 351.
20. J. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF 14-15 (1978).
21. L. LEvY, supra note 15, at 345.
22. Id.
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accepted part of the police routine, and the police exercised this
authority largely without supervision. Such broad discretion was
generally thought to be "indispensable to crime detection. '23 The
public safety demanded it. "[O]ffenses frequently occur . . . [in
which] nothing remains-if police investigation is not to be balked
before it has fairly begun-but to seek out possibly guilty witnesses and ask them questions ... " 4 So wrote Justice Frankfurter in the context of a Connecticut murder of a gas station attendant and his customer in which the only evidence for the police
was the "two corpses and an infant. ' 2 Justice Jackson similarly
observed that the "interrogation of those who know something
26
about the facts is the chief means to the solution of crime.
These Justices were voicing the common view.
Consistent with this understanding, confession was assumed to
be a reliable form of evidence.27 Because a confession is capable of
supplying "ways of verifying itself"2 -- only the guilty man knows
where the murder weapon was discarded, the body concealed, or
the proceeds of the burglary cached-society regarded police questioning as a particularly trustworthy instrument for screening out
the innocent and fastening on the guilty. As Dean McCormick
stated, the "insistent and ever-present forces of self-interest" and
23. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 570-71 (1961); cf. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S.
49, 57-58 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (noting that in cases in which no external evidence
exists, the alternative to interrogation is "to close the books on the crime and forget it with
the suspect at large").
24. Culombe, 367 U.S. at 571.
25. Id. at 570.
26. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 184 (1953); cf. L. MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE
FIFTH AMENDMENT? 92 (1959) (stating that "prevailing opinion seems to be that police interrogation is the method most effective under contemporary American conditions for fostering
guilt on the seasoned lawbreaker"); Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the United States
Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L. REV. 442, 447 (1948) (noting that even the best police departments depend on interrogations and confessions to solve many criminal cases).
27. Watts, 338 U.S. at 58 (Jackson, J., concurring).
28. Of the cases decided by the United States Supreme Court relating to confessions
in the pre-Miranda era between 1936 and 1963, in only a few did the Court express any
doubt as to the guilt of those confessing. Furthermore, the guilt seems as evident in those
cases in which the confession was ultimately suppressed as it does in those in which the
evidence was admitted. See Comment, The Coerced Confession Cases in Search of a Rationale, 31 U. CHL L. REV. 313, 316 (1964). Of the 18 cases of erroneous conviction briefly
described in J. FRANK & B. FRANK, NOT GuILTY (1957), none involved confession. See Robinson, Massiah, Escobedo, and Rationales for the Exclusion of Confessions, 56 J. CRIM. L.,
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCL 412, 415 n.15 (1965); cf. 2 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 867, at 227
(2d ed. 1923) (noting that the danger of a false confession is very slight and the cases in
which it has occurred are quite rare).
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"self-protection" operate to make confession probably true.2 9 Even
when viewed skeptically, questioning was still defended as a species of necessary evil. "The public interest," the New Jersey Supreme Court cautiously argued in 1960, "requires that interrogation . . at a police station, not completely be forbidden, so long
as it is conducted fairly, reasonably, within proper limits and with
full regard to the rights of those being questioned."3 0
In this setting, the Supreme Court did not feel compelled to
burden the government with any special duty to inform the suspect that he need not participate in the inquiry. When the police
did advise a suspect of his right to silence, or the suspect was otherwise aware of it, the suspect's knowledge was considered a factor
contributing to the "voluntariness" of the confession under the
fourteenth amendment;3 1 and, conversely, the absence of such
counseling would weight against admissibility in the "totality of
the circumstances" of the case.3 2 That many suspects might erroneously believe that they were obligated to answer police questions
or that the police acted as if such were the case did not trouble the
Supreme Court. All understood that the government's obligation
was not to counsel the accused but to question him. From this perspective, informing a suspect of his right to silence with the intent
that he be given every opportunity to refuse to cooperate would
have seemed contradictory to the main purpose of imposing
custody.3 3
Implicit in these views was the feeling that some pressuring of
the suspect was permissible to elicit his confession. Professor Fred
E. Inbau in his textbook on interrogation for law enforcement officers captured the judicial as well as the popular sentiment when
he asserted that criminal suspects must be dealt with "in a somewhat lower moral plane than that in which ethical, law-abiding citizens are expected to conduct their everyday affairs."3 4 It was per29. McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 24 Tx. L. REv. 239,
241 (1946).
30. State v. Smith, 32 N.J. 501, 534, 161 A.2d 520, 537 (1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
936 (1961).
31. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
32. Watts, 338 U.S. at 53-54.
33. In the early 1960's, Professors Inbau and Reid assured their readers that "in the
absence of a statutory provision specifically requiring a criminal interrogator to warn a suspect or accused person, it is unnecessary to do so." F. INBAU & J. Ram, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 163-64 (1962). They also cited decisions in 30 states as support for
this proposition. Id. at 163-65 n.46.
34. F. INBAu, La DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 149 (2d ed. 1948); see also

Larson, Present Police and Legal Methods for the Determinationof the Innocence or Guilt
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missible, for example, for an investigator to talk sharply to the
suspect or glare at him or sit too closely or withhold cigarettes, or,
from the opposite vantage, to pretend to be a sympathetic friend
or a concerned coreligionist. Such practices were tolerated or defended not out of sadism or racism or even an overzealous desire to
apprehend felons, but rather out of a pragmatic view of what was
deemed necessary to apprehend criminals.
These sentiments prevailed at a time when the police enjoyed
greater public confidence; when criminals were more likely to be
imagined as a species apart rather than members of the community who had gone astray; and when the confession itself was likely
to be perceived as "a declaration naturally born of remorse, of relief, or desperation, or calculation," rather than the "result of an
overborne will."3 5 Consequently, the Court did not prohibit the police from excluding outsiders-friends or family of the suspect, or
even his attorney-from the interrogation room. The pre-Escobedo
Court considered the denial of counsel to a suspect who had requested counsel or had retained counsel as only one factor among
the "totality of the circumstances" used to determine whether the
confession would be excluded as a violation of due process. The
Court realized that the presence of counsel "would effectively preclude police questioning-fair as well as unfair,"8 and "would
constrict . . . [police ability] to solve difficult cases. '3 7 "[A]ny lawyer worth his salt," in Justice Jackson's oft-quoted phrase, would
"tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no statement to
the police under any circumstances." 3 s
Quoting Lord Devlin, Justice Frankfurter captured pre-Miranda thinking when he wrote that "[t]he least criticism of police
methods of interrogation deserves to be most carefully weighed because the evidence which such interrogation produces is often
decisive."3 9
B. Emerging Post-MirandaAttitudes
Today people appear less interested in reconciling "full regard
to the rights of those being questioned"40 with effective interrogaof the Suspect, 16 J. AM. INST. CraM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 219, 252 (1925).
35. Culombe, 367 U.S. at 576.
36. Crooker, 357 U.S. at 441.
37. Cicenia v. La Gay, 357 U.S. 504, 509 (1958).
38. Watts, 338 U.S. at 59.
39. Culombe, 367 U.S. at 576.
40. Smith, 32 N.J. at 534, 161 A.2d at 537.
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tion. Indeed, as goals they appear irreconcilable to many people.
Confession is seen darkly as the product of police coercion, trickery, or deception. Because confession runs directly against self-interest, one wonders what unscrupulous tactics the police undertook
to compel self-incrimination.
Beyond the problem of irreconcilable goals, society espouses
different attitudes toward suspects. Whereas Professor Inbau and
others once insisted that the police should be given latitude to deal
with suspects on a "lower moral plane, 4 1 today's law professors
argue that the police should treat those justifiably suspected of
crime no differently than nonsuspects. These professors warn that
the police should not use "any tactic that challenges a suspect's
honor or dignity . . [or that is] calculated to make the suspect
feel that he is not a decent or honorable person unless he confesses. ' 42 Such tactics are seen as "assaults upon [human] dignity"
that "should be barred as inherently unfair. ' 43 Others similarly argue that exploiting ignorance is offensive and, therefore, the police
should inform the suspect of such facts as a victim's death lest he
misapprehend that he was confessing to a lesser crime only.44
This concern for the suspect has been applied even when the
confession is volunteered: "[I]f a person enters a police station and
confesses to participation in a robbery which the police, but not
the subject, know also involved a killing, his initial statement will
not be admissible. ' 45 Others have gone further and expressed a
hope that police questioning be prohibited entirely. 4 Whether
these academic proponents of enlarged rights for suspects believe
that no adverse consequences for the public safety are involved or
whether they are simply fearless in the face of the added danger is
47
unclear.
41. F. INBAU, supra note 34, at 149.
42. White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 581, 627-28
(1979).
43. Id.
44. Dix, Mistake, Ignorance,Expectation of Benefit, and the Modern Law of Confessions, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 275, 347-50.
45. Id. at 358.
46. See, e.g., L. WEIE, supra note 5, at 129 (advocating magisterial questioning as
an alternative); Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HAnv. L. REV.
42, 61 (1968) (noting that the only way to right the imbalance created by the "inherently
coercive" atmosphere would be to abolish the interrogation system).
47. A striking characteristic of the academic literature on Miranda (and criminal procedure generally) is the absence of anxiety about the decision's impact on the public safety
and the community's sense of well-being. When commentators make reference to crime control, they usually use such narrow terms as "the police interest" or "law enforcement goals."
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Although today people understand that the experienced criminal is able to resist even strenuous police entreaties, this fact excites neither indignation nor proposals for reform, only acceptance.
Attention is turned instead to the confessor. He is likely to be
imagined as in some way handicapped, a member of a minority
group, or a person under great stress of whom the police have
taken advantage. 48 This poor soul is viewed as the opposite of
Unlike the discussions of perceived police abuse, in which passion abounds, the passing references to the possibility of uncaught murderers and rapists are flat. It is the police rather
than the criminals who are treated as aliens.
Furthermore, the academic writers are virtually unanimous is urging that Miranda
should be strengthened and extended. See, e.g., T. GRIsso, JUVENILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS 202
(1981) ("Legislation to provide blanket exclusion to confessions [of juveniles], or to provide
automatically for effective legal counsel to these juveniles prior to police questioning, would
afford the type of protection which [the results of the study] suggest that these juveniles
need."); 0. STEPHENS, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT 205 (1973) ("Probably nothing short of a blanket requirement that no suspect be questioned except in the
presence of his attorney could be expected to remove the elements of psychological coercion
to which the Court so long objected."); Amsterdam, The Rights of Suspects, in THE RIGHTS
OF AMERICANS 424 (N. Dorsen ed. 1970) ("Miranda does not go far enough. Although its
standards governing waiver of the right to counsel are strict, it does permit findings of
waiver to be made. Those findings will be made by the same old trial judges, following the
same old swearing contest."); Dix, supra note 44, at 326 ("[T]here seems little doubt that
emphasis should continue to be placed upon providing representation during interrogation,
since there is a generally acknowledged need for the assistance of counsel throughout the
criminal justice system."); Griffiths & Ayres, A Postscriptto the Miranda Project: Interrogation of Draft Protestors,77 YALE L.J. 300, 318 (1967) ("For full achievement of Miranda's
values, a suspect needs even more than a sympathetic explanation before his interrogation-he needs a sympathetic advocate during the interrogation."); Leiken, Police Interrogation in Colorado: The Implementation of Miranda, 47 DEN. L.J. 1, 49-50 (1970) ("[T]o
give the present fifth amendment waiver standard more integrity is to make the right of
counsel nonwaivable. . . . As presently applied, Miranda is an expression of judicial mythology. It is a case which impressively defines fundamental rights but does not go far
enough in providing practical remedies."); Special Project, Interrogations in New Haven:
The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519, 1614-15 (1967) ("The Supreme Court spoke in
terms of placing the suspect on an equal footing with the police and of placing the inexperienced on a par with the experienced. If such is the goal, this can be done only by providing
each accused with counsel before the police begin questioning-someone who knows the
system, the institutions, the personalities involved. The lone suspect cannot make a 'free
and informed' choice to speak or remain silent."); cf. Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah
& Miranda: What is "Interrogation"? When does it matter?, 67 GEo. L.J. 1, 97-98 (1978)
(finding that Miranda warnings are ineffective and should be supplemented by a system
which better protects the suspect's constitutional rights).
48. A related perspective sees confession as a manifestation of pathology. The confessor, to satisfy inner neurotic needs, admits to imaginary misconduct. Under Jewish law, for
example, the prohibition against admitting confessions into evidence in criminal matters has
been explained by one commentator as an attempt to prevent depressed and melancholic
persons who want to be put to death from confessing to crimes that they did not commit.
THE PRINcIPLEs OF JEWISH LAW 614 (M. Elon ed. 1975). History provides many examples
when the prospect of punishment has provoked confession by persons overwhelmed with
guilt but entirely innocent of the offense to which they were confessing. In our own history,
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Job: 49 a man who cannot resist admonitions to confess.
III.

THE SUPREME COURT IMPOSES STANDARDS

The change in attitude toward interrogation in recent decades
is largely a consequence of Supreme Court decisions. The Court
drew the map on police practices, identified abuses, and imposed
corrective rules. In the body of law the Court created from 1936 to
1966, one can see the difficulties of regulating police conduct, and
one can find a vantage point from which to evaluate the break with
precedent that occurred in Miranda. The place to begin this examination is Brown v. Mississippi.5 0 Brown was the first state confession case to be reviewed by the Supreme Court and was as appalling on its facts as Miranda was benign.
the Salem witch trials were made possible in part by the confession of one of the first'
women accused of witchcraft, who immediately acknowledged her guilt and launched into a
vivid account of the many ways the devil worked his will in her life. Her confession, like a
contagion, triggered the impulse to confess in others. George Orwell's Animal Farm, published in 1945 following the show trials in Stalinist Russia, reveals the orgiastic proportions
of these spectacles:
Then a sheep confessed to having urinated in the drinking pool . . . and two other
sheep confessed to having murdered an old ram, an especially devoted follower of Napoleon by chasing him round and round a bonfire when he was suffering from a cough.
They are slain on the spot. And so the tale of confessions and executions went on, until
there was a pile of corpses lying before Napoleon's feet.
G. ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 73-74 (Penguin ed. 1951).
Even in the days when people believed in the existence of witches, there was some
awareness that not all confessed witches were credible. For example, in 1672, in Massachusetts Bay Colony, John Broadstreet admitted to "having familiarity with the devil," but the
court was so unimpressed that they fined him for telling a lie and sent him home. K. ERIKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS 155 (1966).
49. "I will hold on to my innocence and will not let it go. My conscience does not
reproach any of my days." Job 25:6.
50. 297 U.S. 278 (1936). Brown was not the Court's first confession case. Nearly 40
years earlier, in Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), the Court utilized the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination to reverse a federal conviction. Even before
Brain the Court relied upon the common law rules of evidence prohibiting promises of leniency or threats to hold confessions inadmissible. The common law rule barring the admissibility of involuntary confessions emerged during the eighteenth century in England. Its development is chronicled in 3 J. WIGMORE, EVDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 860, at 562
n.1 (3d ed. 1940) and L. LEvY, supra note 15, at 327-28. In the United States, the Supreme
Court first invoked the rule in Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884). Reviewing a death sentence for a murder conviction in Hopt, Justice Harlan, without referring to any constitutional provision, concluded for a unanimous Court that the confession was voluntary and
therefore admissible. Cf. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895) (holding that the confession of a person imprisoned and in irons, given under accusations of having committed a
capital offense, are admissible in evidence if the confessions appear to have been made voluntarily, and were not obtained by putting the suspect in fear or by making promises).
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Emergence of the Voluntariness Test

Although the "third degree" was pervasive in the United
States during the first half of this century,51 its application in the
South, where it was fueled by racial prejudice and the spectre of
mob violence, was particularly shocking. Brown represented a
twentieth century application of the rack. At the trial, one deputy
sheriff testified unabashedly to beating the prisoners with a metalbuckled leather strap and volunteered that if the decision had
been his alone, he would have whipped them harder. The beating,
he said, was "[n]ot too much for a negro." 52
In unanimously reversing Brown's conviction, the Court
turned to the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The Court reasoned that the State of Mississippi had substituted
"trial by ordeal" for the constitutionally mandated "fair trial" and
thereby deprived Brown and his codefendants of their guarantee of
53
due process of law.

Chambers v. Florida5 4 was the next confession case to be de.cided after Brown. In Chambers, the Court sought to define the
requirements of due process in less violent situations. Following
Isiah Chambers' arrest for the murder of an elderly man in Pompano, Florida, the local sheriff threatened Chambers with mob violence and then took him to the Dade County jail in Miami, purportedly for his own protection. There, a battery of at least four
officers questioned him continuously for five days and an entire
night before he made his "sunrise confession.
51.

'5 5

Justice Black, re-

The single best source of information on illegal police practices is the NATIONAL

COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON LAwLEssNEss IN LAW ENFORCEMENT (1931) [hereinafter cited as WICKERSHAM REPORT]. For an excellent summary of the

report, see Potts, The PreliminaryExamination and "The Third Degree," 2 BAYLOR L. REV.

131 (1950).
52. Brown, 297 U.S. at 284. What Roscoe Pound asserted about the police generally-that "a feeling that the public are with them is largely behind the boldness with which
high-handed, secret, extra-legal interrogations of persons held incommunicado are constantly carried on"-had special application in the South. Pound, Legal Interrogation of
Persons Accused or Suspected of Crime, 24 J. AM. INsT. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1014, 1017
(1934).
53. Brown, 297 U.S. at 285-86. Parenthetically, it seems as if Mississippi has gone
from one extreme to the other. In Hicks v. State, 355 So. 2d 679 (Miss. 1978), the Mississippi Supreme Court suppressed a confession, because an officer had told the suspect that
he was lying and that it would be better if he told the truth. This admonition, the court felt,
placed grave doubt on the voluntariness of the confession. For cases to the contrary, see
Kaci, Confessions: A Comparison of Exclusion Under Miranda in the United States and
Under the Judges' Rules in England, 10 AM. J. CRiM. L. 87 (1982).
54. 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
55. Id. at 235.
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versing the conviction for a unanimous Court, found that the questioning occurred "under circumstances calculated to break the
strongest nerves and the stoutest resistance. ' 56 Because any person
in the position of these "ignorant young colored tenant farmers"
would have confessed, Black concluded that Chambers' confession
was unreliable because it was not necessarily the product of his
own perception of events. 57 If the interrogators had asked themselves, "Is what we are about to say or do apt to make an innocent
person confess?" they would have had to answer, "Yes." Voluntariness, as defined by Chambers, was roughly synonymous with
trustworthiness.
The Court employed a similar analysis in Ashcraft v. Tennes5
5
see, a 1944 decision. Accused of murdering his wife, Ashcraft was
questioned in relays from Saturday evening until the following
Monday morning, an unbroken stretch of thirty-six hours. The
Court found the interrogation "inherently coercive" because its duration created too high a risk of false confession.5 9 The Court, however, avoided specifying the permissible length of inquiry; it based
its decision on the totality of the circumstances. 6 0 The Court expressed only its unwillingness to utilize a subjective test to decide
whether Ashcraft himself was the sort of man who could "withstand for days pressure that would destroy the will of another in
hours."'
In his dissent, Justice Jackson protested the employment of an
objective standard. The test, he insisted, should be the effect of the
questioning on the subject himself, not some hypothetical person
with assumed powers of resistance. The Court's obligation was to
weigh the insistence of the police in conjunction with Ashcraft's
56. Id. at 238-39.
57. See id. at 238-41.
58. 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
59. Id. at 154.
60. See id. at 152-54. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941), was the first confession case actually to use the "totality of the circumstances" language; cf. Reck v. Pate, 367
U.S. 433, 440 (1961) (noting that voluntariness cannot be measured by looking to the presence or absence of only one circumstance).
61. Ashcraft, 322 U.S. at 162 (Jackson, J., dissenting). On the question of "inherent
coercion," Jackson had this rejoinder:
The Court bases its decision on the premise that custody and examination of a prisoner
for thirty-six hours is "inherently coercive." Of course it is. And so is custody and
examination for one hour. Arrest itself is inherently coercive, and so is detention. When
not justified, infliction of such indignities upon the person is actionable as a tort. Of
course such acts put pressure upon the prisoner to answer questions[,] to answer them
truthfully, and to confess if guilty.
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"strength or weakness, whether he was educated or illiterate, intelligent or moronic, well or ill, Negro or white. '6 2 Jackson himself
found Ashcraft to be neither an "ignorant" person nor a "victim of
prejudice," but instead "a white man of good reputation, good position and substantial .property. ' 63 Jackson would thus have
treated his confession as "voluntary" for due process purposes."
In the setting of cases such as Chambers and Ashcraft, the
Court defined voluntariness in a technical sense, at odds with common usage. In ordinary discourse, voluntariness suggests free will,
choice, even spontaneity. In the typical interrogation, however,
there is some coercion; the suspect is detained, queried, challenged,
and contradicted. Chambers and Ashcraft employed the voluntariness concept as a shorthand for the conclusion that a confession
had to be obtained under circumstances that made it trustworthy.
B.

Voluntariness as Fairness

Over time, the voluntariness test evolved into more than a
proxy for credibility. It became a vehicle for evaluating not only
the effect of interrogative techniques on a suspect's will but also
the propriety of police conduct, isolated from and unrelated to its
impact on the suspect. In Lisenba v. California,65 a particularly
grisly case of wife murder, the Court stated that to meet due process standards, the police would have to obtain confessions by using methods that comported with a standard of basic fairness.
"The aim of the requirement of due process," the Court announced, was "not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to
prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether
' In other cases, the Court
true or false." 66
continued to stress that
the reliability of the statement was not enough to warrant admissibility if the police methods were unfair. In Rogers v. Richmond,7
for example, the Court stated that the defendant's statement must
be evaluated with "complete disregard of whether or not. . .[he]
spoke the truth.'68 In Stein v. New York,"9 Justice Frankfurter
wrote that judges must avoid being influenced by "the confirma62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id. at 173.
Id. at 168.
314 U.S. 219 (1941).
Id. at 236.
365 U.S. 534 (1961).
Id. at 544.
346 U.S. 156 (1953).
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tion of details in the confession by reliable other evidence" or by a
"feeling of certitude that the accused is guilty of the crime to
' 70
which he confessed.
Eventually, the concept of voluntariness became a hybrid containing elements of subjective and objective inquiry. In determining voluntariness, the Court focused on the conduct of the police in
conjunction with the personal characteristics of the arrestee. It
weighed "the circumstances of pressure against the power of resistance of the person confessing. '7 1 When the pressure was low and
the resistance high, the statement of the suspect was labeled voluntary and admitted into evidence. Conversely, when the suspect
seemed especially vulnerable and the police especially aggressive,
the Court excluded the confession. For example, in Haley v.
Ohio,72 the Court reversed the conviction of a black youth, who,
along with two others, had confessed to murdering the owner of a
confectionary store, largely because he was "only 15 years old," "a
tender and difficult age for a boy of any race. '73 Justice Douglas,
stressing the limited capacity of juveniles, chastised the police for
their "callous attitude" and "disregard of the standards of decency ' 74 in treating Haley as if he had the decisionmaking capability of an adult.
Other cases also singled out acts of perceived unfairness. In
Spano v. New York 7 5 the Court expressed disapproval with the police tactic of utilizing a uniformed officer who was a longtime
friend of the accused to pressure the accused into confessing by
telling him that the officer would lose his job on the force unless a
confession was forthcoming. 76 In Rogers v. Richmond77 the Court
objected to the police threat of calling in the accused's wife, who
suffered from an arthritic condition, for questioning should Rogers
78
fail to admit to the crime.
Although registering its disapproval of these particular acts,
the Court did not denote them constitutional violations per se, automatically requiring exclusion of the confession. A conviction
would be reversed only if on "all the facts" or under the "totality
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 200 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 185 (1953).
332 U.S. 596 (1948).
Id. at 599-600.
Id. at 600.
360 U.S. 315 (1959).
Id. at 323.
365 U.S. 534 (1961).
Id. at 541-44.
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of the circumstances" the Court found that the method of interrogation had been too unfair or that the suspect's free will had been
overborne.79
C. The Strengths of the Voluntariness Test
The totality of the circumstances approach frequently has
been criticized. 0 Commentators have noted that its elusive boundaries made the admissibility of a particular confession difficult to
predict. To some extent the decision to admit or exclude a statement depended on whether the trial court judge was squeamish or
tough, sensitive or callous. But to argue that the Supreme Court,
by putting the entire police-suspect confrontation under a microscope, made "[a]lmost everything. . . relevant, but almost nothing
. . . decisive" 8 ' seems to be a great exaggeration. It is clear from

the Court's decisions that if the police engaged in certain practices-prolonged detention, relay questioning, threats or other intimidation, promises of benefit, denial of food or sleep-they did
so at their peril. Although the most influential textbook on interrogation of the time is best known today because the Court in Mi79. The Court was also likely to reverse a conviction if aggravating circumstances were
present that would have made the Court hesitate to affirm the conviction even under the
earlier, voluntariness-as-reliability test. Spano, for example, was a highly emotional person
who had been questioned for eight hours straight. And in Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S.
199 (1960), in which the Court suppressed the confession of a mentally ill person, it observed that its "judgment can without difficulty be articulated in terms of the unreliability
of the confession" as well as out of a "strong conviction that our system of law enforcement
should not operate so as to take advantage of a person" while insane. Id. at 207.
80. For an excellent summary of the deficiencies of the voluntariness test as seen by
its critics, see Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court (Book Review), 79 MICH. L. REV. 865,
867-78 (1981). The classic critique is Y. KAmSAR, What is an "Involuntary" Confession?, in
POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS 1 (1980). See also Kamisar, Gates, "Probable
Cause," "Good Faith" and Beyond, 69 IOWA L. REV. 551, 570 (1984) (stating that in preEscobedo, pre-Miranda days when the voluntariness test prevailed, "[a]Imost everything
was relevant, but almost nothing was decisive."). Perhaps the underlying basis for the crticism of the test was that it "accomodated law enforcement interests to a much greater extent than it accommodated" individual interests. Id. at 571.
For a creative attempt to breathe new life into the voluntariness test, see Grano, Voluntariness,Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 785 (1979).
81. Kamisar, supra note 80, at 570; see also Dix, supra note 44, at 293 ("[M]aking
'everything' relevant-and nothing necessarily determinative-also eliminated the necessity
for specific discussion of the legal effect of single factors. Relieved from the necessity of
addressing the significance of each factor, the Court tended to explain its results in the
broad, often meaningless, 'overbearing of the will' or the 'totality of the circumstances' language. This, of course, greatly reduced the pressure to explain specifically why particular
characteristics of a case were significant and thus facilitated avoidance of what would undoubtedly have been difficult analysis.").

1985]

QUESTIONING MIRANDA

1433

randa disparaged it, the Inbau and Reid manual s2 served to upgrade police practices by making those practices responsive to the
stated concerns of the Supreme Court. And there seems to be no
doubt that by the time of the great doctrinal changes of the
1960's-Escobedo,83 Massiah,s4 and Mirandas 5 -the police were
operating with far greater sensitivity to constitutional requirements.8 6 In short, after nearly thirty years of judicial development,
the voluntariness test was an evolving moral inquiry into what was
decent and fair in police interrogation practices.
Since its first review of a state confession case in Brown v.
Mississippi,87 the Court both had provided much guidance to the
police and had left important questions unanswered. Its voluntariness test was like an edifice in which many stones had been laid
but not all were cemented, and there was no master plan to order
future construction. Unlike the construction of a building, however, incompleteness was part of the design. It allowed the Court
to move carefully, to feel its way, and to make its judgments with82.

F. INBAU & J. REI, supra note 33.

83.

Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).

84. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
85. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
86. It may be that we do not want to bind the police completely to due process standards. When life is at stake, the procedures we endorse for the investigation of the routine
felony may be too restrictive. For example, if in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, reh'g
denied, 431 U.S. 925 (1977), Captain Learning had made his now famous appeal to conscience, the "Christian burial" speech, with good reason to believe that Pamela Powers, the
kidnapped little girl, was still alive, and Williams responded by exercising his right to silence, would we want Learning to end his interrogation and go searching elsewhere for other
leads, or would we want the police to continue to ask where Pamela was even if these questions intimidated Williams? On this point, see Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of
Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 929, 949 (1965).
The Supreme Court recently recognized the merits of this argument in New York v.
Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984). The majority in Quarlescreated a "public safety" exception
to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect's answers will be admitted into evidence. Even the dissent in Quarles allowed that at times extralegal police
action is required:
If a bomb is about to explode or the public is otherwise imminently imperiled, the
police are free to interrogate suspects without advising them of their constitutional
rights. Such unconsented questioning may take place not only when police officers act
on instinct but also when higher faculties lead them to believe that advising a suspect
of his constitutional rights might decrease the likelihood that the suspect would reveal
life-saving information. If trickery is necessary to protect the public, then the police
may trick a suspect into confessing.
Id. at 2648 (Marshall, J., dissenting). But the dissent drew the line at allowing the fruits of
these interrogations into evidence. The dissent concluded that even under emergency circumstances, "the Fifth Amendment forbids. . . the introduction of coerced statements at
trial." Id.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 50-53.
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out fear of prematurely constitutionalizing interrogation practices.
The Court was, it is true, often divided in its judgments, but
the fragmentation was less a by-product of the voluntariness standard than a reflection of deep cleavages in society that were at last
becoming apparent.8 8 The Court's failure to state the basis for a
particular decision or its blurring of a holding in the guise of the
"totality of the circumstances" can be seen as shrewd and responsible pragmatism. Pragmatism may have been preferable to principles at a time when there was little general agreement on the principles to be applied. "" When social cohesion and solidarity are
strained, there is merit in an approach that, while showing direction toward increased police restraint, proceeds imprecisely and
with some ambiguity, avoiding reductionism and overgeneralization. In applying the voluntariness test, the Court was able to put
existing police practices into plainer view-its inquiry was a search
for existential fact, an attempt to capture what actually happened
at the police station-and to focus the issues more sharply. If the
development of the voluntariness test had not come to a near end
with the advent of Miranda,9" perhaps the test would have contin88. When judges are making essentially moral decisions, it is to be expected that a
particular jurist's fear or fearlessness of crime will come into play, as will his attitudes toward order and freedom generally. But this is not so much a shortcoming of the voluntariness test as an attribute of judging.
89. See generally Atiyah, From Pinciples to Pragmatism:Changes in the Function of
the Judicial Process and the Law, 65 IowA L. REV. 1249 (1980) (discussing the tension that
exists between principle and pragmatism in the judicial process and explaining the shift in
the judicial process away from a system based on principles and toward a system based on
pragmatism).
90. Although Miranda was designed as a supplementary test to be applied in conjunction with the traditional due process voluntariness test, in practice it has operated more as a
substitute than a supplement. Justice Marshall recently noted:
We do not suggest that compliance with Miranda conclusively established the voluntariness of a subsequent confession. But cases in which a defendant can make a colorable
argument that a self-incriminating statement was "compelled" despite the fact that the
law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.
Berkemer v. McCarty, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3147 n.20 (1984); see also M. BERGER, TAKING THE
FIFTH 150 (1980); S. SALZBERG, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 464 (1984); Duke, The Interpretive Struggle Over the Voluntariness Concept, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 22, 1983, at 21, col. 2.
Because the prosecution usually can prove the voluntariness of the waiver more easily
than it can prove the voluntariness of the confession, the exchange of fourteenth amendment for fifth amendment protection has resulted in a net dimunition of rights. "When one
also considers the rather relaxed standards that have come to be applied in determining the
validity of Mirandawaivers, the ultimate irony of Miranda may well be that the police are
freer to use coercive tactics now than they were before that landmark decision." Note, Police Use of Trickery as an InterrogationTechnique, 32 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1181 (1979).
Nevertheless, there are instances in which courts that have found a valid waiver of Miranda rights have suppressed the defendant's statements as involuntary, but these cases are
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ued to achieve definition and improved serviceability.

IV.

EROSION OF THE VOLUNTARINESS TEST

A.

Gallegos v. Colorado

In retrospect, it is easy to see Gallegos v. Colorado,91 decided
in 1962 by a four to three majority, as an ideological harbinger of
both Escobedo and Miranda. Robert Gallegos, a "child of 14, ' ' 9
and two companions followed an elderly man into his hotel and
used a ruse to enter his room. Once in his room, they assaulted him
and stole thirteen dollars. It was their second assault of the day,
and, this time, the victim died. Later, a juvenile officer spotted
Gallegos and his two younger brothers sitting on the curb in front
of a local restaurant. Since the youths matched the description of
the felons, the officer identified himself and invited the boys to
come sit in his car. Gallegos did so and almost "immediately ad93
mitted the assault and robbery" (the victim had not yet died).
Gallegos repeated the confession the next day and once more five
days later by signing a "formal" confession.
Although at times segregated during his confinement, Gallegos
was allowed to eat and converse with the other youths. By his own
account, he was not intensely questioned during this period nor
mistreated. Before making his "formal" confession, he had been
advised of his right to remain silent, of the possibility that a murder charge might be placed against him, and of his right to be represented by counsel and to have his family present. Gallegos expressly indicated that he did not want an attorney and signed the
confession.9
In terms of the traditional criteria of the voluntariness
test-length of questioning, denial of access to others, awareness of
one's right to withhold incriminating information-there was little
to commend the case for reversal, 95 unless as a matter of law a
fourteen year old was held incapable of making a voluntary confesuncommon. See, e.g., People v. Hogan, 31 Cal. 3d 815, 647 P.2d 93 (1982); see also United
States v. Koch, 552 F.2d 1216 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that after the defendant declined to
sign a written waiver of his rights, the government failed to meet its burden of establishing
the voluntariness of the subsequent confession).
91. 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
92. Id. at 49.
93. Id. at 50.
94. Id. at 61 (Clark, J., dissenting).
95. Perhaps the most troubling feature of the case was that Gallegos had been sentenced to life imprisonment.
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sion. The Court had refused to take this drastic course earlier in
97
Haley v. Ohio,96 in which police pressures were far more evident,
and it hesitated to do so here as well, resting its decision to reverse
the conviction on the totality of the circumstances. Weight was accorded not only to Gallegos' youth but also to the authorities' failure to grant his parents immediate access to him and to present
him promptly before the juvenile court. In addition, the Court focused on the superior status of the police officer investigating the
case: "[W]e deal with a person [Gallegos] who is not equal to the
police in knowledge and understanding of the consequences of the
questions and answers being recorded and who is unable to know
how to protect his own interests or how to get the benefits of his
constitutional rights.""8
The assertion that Gallegos was "not equal to the police," although surely correct, was nonetheless jarring. Why should this
circumstance be relevant to whether an otherwise voluntary confession is admissible into evidence? The traditional inquiry was
whether a particular suspect, however unequal in legal knowledge,
emotional stability, and mature judgment, made a "voluntary"
statement, not whether the government had the upper hand during
interrogation. Although the absence of advice from his parents or a
lawyer made it more likely that Gallegos would confess, this confession was in the public interest as long as the police acted with
sufficient restraint. Gallegos' oral confession in the police car followed the officer's opening questions so quickly that the confession
almost can be characterized as volunteered rather than voluntary.
Nevertheless, the Court determined that the police showed "callous disregard" for Gallegos' "constitutional rights.""9
The implications of Gallegos extended far beyond the special
problems of juveniles. If it is true, as the Court concluded, that
"[a]dult advice would have put [Gallegos] on a less unequal footing
with his interrogators," 00 then the same reasoning would apply to
the adult suspect who was still not a match for the officer. Professor Donald King observed that the Court's argument logically extended to "all cases involving lack of knowledge or appreciation of
' and he even suggested that the Court introduced a "new
rights,"10
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

332 U.S. 596 (1948).
Haley had been questioned in relays for most of the night.
Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 54.
Id.
Id.
King, Developing a Future ConstitutionalStandard for Confessions,8 WAYNE L.
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constitutional standard. . . under the guise of the traditional [voluntariness] test.'' 1 0 2 Of course, under the voluntariness test, the
Gallegos Court focused on those characteristics of the defendant-his age, intelligence, mental stability, experience in
life-that might make his statement unreliable or the interrogation
itself unfair; but, prior to Gallegos, the Court had never conceptualized the problems of interrogation in terms of equality.
B.

Escobedo v. Illinois

"There is a case in the Supreme Court that. . . involves...
[the right to counsel] and I am scared that the Court is going to
hold that this right exists from the time of arrest-if a person asks
for counsel and he is not given counsel, anything you get from him
after that is to be excluded.' 0 3 So wrote Professor Inbau, the leading champion of broad police investigative powers. As events tran4
spired, his premonition was warranted. Escobedo v. Illinois1'
marked a turning point in the law of confessions.
Following the shooting of his brother-in-law, Danny Escobedo
was questioned for several hours about the killing before his attorney secured his release. He made no statement. Ten days later, the
police learned from another suspect, one DiGerlando, that Escobedo had been the trigger man. Escobedo was again arrested and
questioned. During this second interrogation, Escobedo asked to
see his attorney. At the same time, his attorney unsuccessfully
sought admission to the homicide bureau where Escobedo was being held. This time the questioning was successful. When one of
the detectives challenged Escobedo, who had been calling DiGerlando a liar, to repeat the accusation in front of DiGerlando, Escobedo agreed. DiGerlando was brought in, then Escobedo accused
REv. 481, 487-88 (1962).
102. Id. at 481. In an earlier case, decided in 1951, also involving a defendant named
Gallegos, the Court adverted to the defendant's need for legal advice. Gallegos, an itinerant
Mexican farmworker who could neither read nor speak English, had confessed to killing his
girl friend. In assessing the voluntariness of his confession, the Court looked to the circumstances: his "lack of education and familiaritywith our law, his experience and condition in
life, his need for advice of counsel as to the law of homicide and the probable effect on such
a man of interrogation during [four days of] confinement." Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S.
55, 68 (1951) (emphasis added). Unlike the other factors cited by the Court it is unclear how
Gallegos' understanding of the law of homicide related to his ability to withstand police
pressure. What was it that Gallegos did not know that the counsel could help him
understand?
103. Inbau, A Forum on the Interrogationof the Accused, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 382, 401
(1964).
104. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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him of lying in these words: "I didn't shoot Manuel, you did it.' 10 5
Thus Escobedo inadvertently implicated himself in the murder.
On its facts, Escobedo bore little resemblance to prior cases.
The police had used no force, no intimidation, no questioning in
relays, and no denials of food or sleep. Furthermore, Escobedo suffered no special handicap. He was not mentally disturbed, illiterate, the victim of discrimination, or inexperienced in the ways of
the world. Perhaps most importantly, Escobedo had retained a
lawyer, and in prior conversations with his lawyer, he had been
told what he "should do in the event of interrogation.' '106 Finally,
during a chance encounter with his attorney during the interrogation-when the door to the homicide bureau was opened briefly,
the attorney walked by-Escobedo took his attorney's passing gesture to mean that he should keep silent. Nonetheless, in a five-tofour decision, the Court reversed the conviction and held the statement inadmissible:
We hold ... that where ... the investigation ... has begun to focus on a
particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police
carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating
statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to
consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his
absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has been denied
107
'the Assistance of Counsel' in violation of the Sixth Amendment ....

1. The Role of Counsel at the Police Station
Prior to Escobedo, the Justices' decisions had made reference
to the role of counsel at the station house, particularly in the dissents of Justices Black and Douglas. Justice Jackson's 1949 dissent
in Watts v. Indiana,0 8 however, stands as the most forthright and
penetrating statement of the interests at stake:
[O]ne serious situation seems to me to stand out in these [confession] cases.
The suspect neither had nor was advised of his right to get counsel. This
presents a real dilemma in a free society. To subject one without counsel to
questioning which may and is intended to convict him, is a real peril to individual freedom. To bring in a lawyer means a real peril to solution of the
crime, because, under our adversary system, he deems that his sole duty is to
protect his client-guilty or innocent-and that in such a capacity he owes no
duty whatever to help society solve its crime problem. Under this conception
of criminal procedure, any lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no
uncertain terms to make no statement to police under any circumstances.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 483.
Id. at 485 n.5.
Id. at 490-91.
338 U.S. 49 (1949).
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If the State may arrest. . . and interrogate without counsel, there is no
denying the fact that it largely negates the benefits of the constitutional guaranty of the right to assistance of counsel. Any lawyer who has ever been
called into a case after his client has "told all". . . knows how helpless he is
to protect his client against the facts thus disclosed.
I suppose the view one takes will turn on what one thinks should be the
right of an accused person against the State. Is it his right to have the judgment on the facts? Or is it his right to have a judgment based on only such
evidence as he cannot conceal from the authorities, who cannot compel him
to testify in court and also cannot question him before? Our system comes
close to the latter by any interpretation, for the defendant is shielded by such
safeguards as no system of law except the Anglo American concedes to him. 109

In striking the balance, Jackson came down against a right to
counsel at the station house: "I doubt very much if. . . [the Constitution and Bill of Rights] require us to hold that the State may
not take into custody and question one suspected reasonably of an
unwitnessed murder." 110
In Escobedo, the balance was struck differently."" Unlike earlier opinions such as Gallegos in which the role of counsel was only
vaguely specified as one factor in the "totality of the circumstances," the Court in Escobedo precisely identified how Escobedo
had been injured by being denied access to his attorney: "Petitioner, a layman, was undoubtedly unaware that under Illinois law
an admission of 'mere' complicity was legally as damaging as an
admission of firing the fatal shots." The "guiding hand of counsel"
was "essential" in this "delicate situation" to inform Escobedo of
12
the applicable rules of law.
The Court was not swayed by the fact that Escobedo had actually received instructions from his attorney concerning what to
do in the event of police questioning. This guidance could not correct the imbalance. The Court noted that the attorney may not
have contemplated "what petitioner should, or could, do in the
face of a false statement that he had fired the fatal bullets."'1 3
109. Id. at 59 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 61 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
111. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), decided a few months earlier, also
illustrates how far the Court was prepared to utilize the sixth amendment to change existing
law. Whereas Escobedo had the advice of counsel prior to being questioned, Massiah did not
even know that the government was trying to elicit information from him because the government used an accomplice as its agent. To Professor Kamisar, this smacked of unsportsmanlike conduct. Massiah, he argued, was in one sense "more seriously imposed on"
than Escobedo because "he did not, and could not be expected to, keep his guard up 'because he did not even know that he was under interrogation by a government agent.'"
Kamisar, supra note 47, at 39-40 (quoting Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206).
112. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 486.
113. Id. at 485 n.5.

1440

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1417

In making Escobedo's ignorance of a technical point of complicity law dispositive, the Court laid the foundation for an unrestricted right to counsel during custodial interrogation." 4 Only a
rare arrestee would know this subtlety of criminal law. Escobedo
was just a layman on his own in the adversarial world of the law.
In these strange waters, how could he, or any other suspect, navigate confidently? How could he know as much as his more experienced police opponents? The Court obviously was concerned that,
without a lawyer, he would be at risk; he might incriminate
himself. ' 5
The Escobedo Court did not define the role of counsel in this
new setting. The tone of the opinion is defensive; the customary
conciliatory language toward police and prosecution is absent. Responding to the charge that the presence of counsel would eliminate all interrogation, the Court countered: "[I]f the exercise of
constitutional rights will thwart the effectiveness of a system of
law enforcement, then there is something very wrong with that system. 1" 6 This statement is misleading because the right that the
Court was defending, far from being of long standing, was newly
discovered, indeed created, in this very opinion. What may have
been "very wrong" was not the extant "system," but the right the
Court just announced.
In the absence of any guidance from the Escobedo Court, what
can be said about the proper role of counsel? Danny Escobedo's
lawyer had advised him not to say anything to the police. If the
homicide detectives had granted Escobedo's request to see his attorney again, there would have been nothing additional for his attorney to communicate. Escobedo had already been given all the
assistance his counsel could provide without actually being present
to assist his client on a question-by-question basis. Was Escobedo's
attorney seeking the right to be present during the interrogation?
114. In California v. Stewart, 385 U.S. 890 (1966), one of the cases consolidated for
decision in Miranda, counsel for Stewart drew upon the Escobedo rationale by arguing that
his client was unaware of the rule of law that punished deaths occurring accidentally during
the course of a felony as severely as those intentionally caused. Stewart "didn't know the
consequences of the felony murder doctrine." R. MEDALIE, supra note 16, at 183.
115. See Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 U. MINN. L. REv. 47, 58-68 (1964).
116. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 490. To this assertion, the Court added another: "[A] system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the 'confession' will, in the long
run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a system which depends on extrinsic
evidence independently secured through skillful investigation." Id. at 488-89. To the police,
this hint at mysterious means of catching felons must have been particularly galling.
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Probably not. His intent in seeking entry to the homicide bureau
was most likely to bring the interrogation to a close. 117 Given that
a defense attorney's usual objective is to stop the interrogation, it
is hard to understand why the Court was so certain that "no system worth preserving should have to fear that if an accused person
is permitted to consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and
exercise . . . [his] rights," unless the Court simply believed that
there was no social utility in police interrogation. 11 8 The Escobedo
opinion contains no hint of anxiety that harm may accrue from a
right to counsel: that there may be fewer confessions and more
crime.
2.

The "Sporting Theory" of Justice

The Escobedo majority opinion demonstrates a change in the
Court's, and perhaps society's, perception of the accused. The
opinion shows sympathy for Danny Escobedo because he was the
underdog. One detects what Thurman Arnold referred to as "the
humanitarian notion that the underdog is always entitled to a
chance."' 1 9
Perhaps the impulse to allow even the unquestionably guilty
some prospect of escaping detection or conviction is universal. 20
Wigmore referred to this impulse as the "instinct of giving the
game fair play."' 2' Pound characterized it as "the sporting theory"
of justice, 1 22 and Bentham derisively labeled it "the fox hunter's
reason." 23 Under this view, fairness is given that special definition
that sportsmen reserve for their games. Bentham elaborated on his
analogy to the fox hunt: "The fox is to have a fair chance for his
117. Cf. W. SCHAEFER, supra note 16, at 53 (noting that a lawyer's primary function at
the station house is to tell the suspect not to talk).
118. In contrast, the English allow "every person at any stage of an investigation...
to consult privately with a solicitor ...

provided that ...

no unreasonable delay or hin-

drance is caused to the processes of investigation or the administration of justice by his
doing so." Home Office Circular, The Judges' Rules and Administrative Directions to the
Police, 1964 CRM. L. REV. (Eng.) 165, 167; cf. Criminal Law Act of 1977, § 62, cited in
HANSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, ANNUAL ABRIDGEmENT 635 (1977) (not recognizing a right to
have an attorney present during the actual interrogation-it is a matter of police discretion-since there may be a good reason to hold an arrested person incommunicado for a
limited period).
119. T. ARNOLD, SYMOLS OF GOVERNMENT 135 (1935).
120. See id. at 139.
121. 1A J. WIGMORE, supra note 50, § 57, at 1185.
122. Pound, The Causes of PopularDissatisfactionwith the Administration of Justice, 29 A 1A REP. 395, 404-05 (1906).
123. 5 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JuDIcbL EVIDENCE 238 (1827).
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life: he must have ... leave to run a certain length of way, for the
express purpose of giving him a chance for escape."'1 2 4 Fairness, so
defined, dictates that neither side should have an undue advantage; the police and the criminal should be on roughly equal footing and the rules of the game should be drawn to avoid favoring
one side or the other. As Justice Fortas put it in a well-known article (written before he joined the Court), the accused and the accuser are "equals, meeting in battle."' 12 5 The state was sovereign,
but so was the individual. The individual possessed the "sovereign
right . . . to meet the state on terms as equal as their respective
resource
strength against' 2strength,
strength would permit ...
6
against resource, argument against argument.'
In the context of police interrogation, this outlook translates
as follows: treating the accused fairly, as a worthy adversary,
means encouraging him to view his right to silence as a weapon at
his disposal, to be used when it offers the best chance of dismissal
or acquittal. The suspect should be allowed to present his case in
the time, place, and manner that, in accordance with his understanding or that of his attorney, will be most advantageous.
And,
127
of course, he must be told all the rules of the contest.
Danny Escobedo did not know the relevant rule relating to the
liability of accomplices. As Chief Justice Warren subsequently
124. Id. at 238-39. Similarly, John Stuart Mill criticized those who "speak and act...
as if they regarded a criminal trial as a sort of game, partly of chance, partly of skill, in
which the proper end to be aimed at is, not that the truth may be discovered, but that both
parties may have fair play; in a word, that whether a guilty person shall be acquitted or
punished, may be, as nearly as possible, an even chance." Id. at 318.
125. Fortas, The Fifth Amendment: Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Prodere, 25 J. CLEv. BA
91, 98 (1954).
126. Id.
127. The sporting theory philosophy is particularly evident in the writings of Professor
George Dix. Dix writes:
A major objective of the law of confessions . . . should be regarded as assuring that a
person who confesses does so with as complete an understanding of his tactical position
as possible. This, of course, would require awareness not only of his abstract legal
rights, but also of his practical ability to implement those rights in light of his factual
situation and of the tactical wisdom of asserting them.
Dix, supra note 44, at 330-331. Professor Dix also argues that
if a person enters a police station and confesses to participation in a robbery which the
police, but not the subject, know also involved a killing, his initial statement [should]
not be admissible. A subsequent statement will be, however, but only if. . . the officers
inform the subject of the death and his potential liability for it and, in order to avoid
the second statement being the fruit of the first, insure that he understands that his
initial statement is not admissible against him.
Id. at 358 (emphasis in original); see also White, supra note 42, at 627-28 (arguing that the
police should not use "any tactic that challenges a suspect's honor and dignity").
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noted in Miranda, Escobedo "fully intended his accusation of another [DiGerlando] . .. to be exculpatory as to himself.1' 2

Be-

cause the government took advantage of this unawareness in its
interrogation, the Court penalized the government by denying it
the use of Escobedo's confession as evidence in any subsequent
trial. The government had failed to comport itself within the
bounds of this new definition of fairness.
The sporting theory of justice, as Pound observed, has great
attraction; but its appeal is easier to experience than to explain. In
its origins, it may draw upon our childhood experiences with our
parents, when justice was perceived largely in terms of equal treatment with our brothers and sisters. Beyond that, there seems to be
something distinctly American in the subversive notion of beating
the law, even though this feeling may be "only a survival of the
days when a lawsuit was a fight between two clans" rather than a
'129
"fundamental right of jurisprudence.

The weakness of the sporting theory in the context of Escobedo is not so much what Pound suggests, that by "its exaggerated
contentious procedures ... [it gives] the whole community a false

notion of the purpose and the end of the law,"130 but rather that
by arming the suspect with counsel at the station house the Court
strikes the wrong balance-it gives the suspect too great an advantage. If the police are too formidable for the average offender, a
lawyer will be too formidable for the average investigator. The lawyer will protect his client from injuring himself by confessing.
Thus, even if one sees criminal law as a "mere game," to use
Pound's expression, Escobedo may deprive the government of a
fair chance at victory. By design, Escobedo was a significant step
toward barring "from evidence all admissions obtained from an individual suspected of crime, whether involuntarily made or not."131
V. Miranda v. Arizona
After Escobedo was decided in the early summer of 1964, commentators predicted that the Supreme Court would wait to observe
the effects of what Time magazine referred to as a "constitutional
thunderbolt" and a "cop's nightmare.' ' 3 2 The decision not only
triggered sharp criticism but also inspired an unprecedented inter128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966).
Pound, supra note 122, at 405.
Id. at 406.
Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 495 (White, J., dissenting).
Concern About Confessions, TIME,Apr. 29, 1966, at 52.
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est in police investigative practices. The American Bar Association,
the American Law Institute, and the National Crime Commission
independently undertook studies of police methods. In addition,
the law enforcement establishment was engaged in a critical selfexamination of its procedures. Increasingly, the evidence suggested
that the police were more restrained and law-abiding than ever.
The most recent studies showed that interrogations were
short-less than thirty minutes on the average 1 S-and that coercion was infrequent.134 The Court could thus have sat back and
awaited the forthcoming proposals for reform fostered by its Escobedo decision. Unlike the areas of reapportionment and segregation, nonjudicial efforts could have filled the gaps left by the
Court. To the dismay of many, 5 however, the Court did not pause
for long: on June 13, 1966, by a five-to-four majority,"s it decided
13 7
Miranda v. Arizona.
As with many criminal cases, there was a fortuitous quality to
Ernesto Miranda's arrest and conviction for rape.138 He almost escaped detection. His teenage victim was so shy and easily confused
that she appeared to be lying even when she was telling the truth.
Moreover, there were apparent discrepancies in her initial report
133.

Barrett, Police Practices and the Law-From Arrest to Release or Charge, 50

CALIF. L. REV. 11, 42-44 (1962).
134. W. LAFAVE, ARREST~ THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 386 (1965).

Professor LaFave described the interrogation practices in 1965 as follows:
In the great majority of in-custody interrogations observed [in the states of Michigan, Wisconsin, and Kansas in 1956 and 1957], the possibility of coercion appeared
slight. In many instances the suspect is merely confronted with the evidence against
him or with evidence inconsistent with his prior statements and is asked to give an
explanation.. . . Lengthy, continuous questioning is the exception ....
In practice
the interrogating detective often terminates the questioning after a brief period to appear in court or. . . to check upon the statements already given by the suspect.
Id.
135. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 523-24 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting); G.
WHITE, EARL WARREN 271 (1982); Bickel, Is the Warren Court Too "Political"?,in THE
SUPREME COURT UNDER EARL WARREN 216, 221-22 (L. Levy ed. 1972).
136. That Miranda'scontroversial message was supported by only five members of the
Court remains a troubling feature of the case. However one evaluates the Supreme Court, it
is an antimajoritarian institution. Its claim to hegemony is a limited one, arising from its
responsibility to interpret the Constitution. When it embarks on momentous changes without a solid majority of the justices, it places its own legitimacy in jeopardy. Beyond that, it
invites counter-reaction. The Burger Court, created by a slight shift in composition, was
placed in the untenable position of either endorsing a rule of constitutional law of which it
disapproved or overruling Miranda and risking the Court's special moral status.
137. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
138. Although the Supreme Court cursorily treated the facts of the four cases consolidated for decision in Miranda, recent research has provided a rich narrative of Miranda
from arrest to final appeal. See L. BAKER, Miranda: CRIME, LAw & POLITICS (1983).
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to the police. The medical investigation did not confirm her assertion that she was a virgin at the time of the rape; and when Miranda was placed in a lineup with only two others, she could not
make a positive identification.
But the investigating officers, convinced that she was truthful,
employed a routine trick to encourage Miranda to confess. Following the lineup, when Miranda inquired of them, "How did I do?"
they replied, "You flunked." 139 Miranda's questioning was mild; it
was conducted at midday by only two men who made no hint of
force, and it lasted only two hours. Before it was over, Miranda
had confessed not only to the rape for which he had been arrested,
but also to attempting the rape of a second victim, and trying to
rob still a third person. Once his confession was reduced to writing,
the officers brought his victim into the interrogation room and
14 0
asked Miranda if he recognized her. "That's the girl," he replied.
When Miranda identified his victim for the police, he believed
that she already had picked him out of the lineup. But neither this
deception nor anything else that transpired during the questioning
particularly troubled the Supreme Court three years later; Miranda's confession met existing due process standards for voluntariness. The Miranda Court was concerned about something quite
different and novel.
A.

The Fifth Amendment Rationale

Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Warren held that, prior to
any questioning, the police must warn a suspect in custody "that
he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make
may be used ... against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.'' These warnings were to be administered in every case without regard for
whether the accused was competent or experienced. If the police
failed to issue the warnings, any statement secured from the suspect, however voluntary, would be treated as coerced. A suspect
conceivably could waive his rights, but "[i]f the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is
taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate
that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege
against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
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The Court thus stationed a fifth amendment high hur-

dle at the threshold of every police inquiry.
This reliance on the fifth amendment surprised many. Apart
from a few early federal decisions,143 the fifth amendment had
fallen into disuse as the constitutional basis for judging the coerciveness of police interrogation, and only two years earlier the
Court had introduced the sixth amendment right to counsel as the
vehicle for governing custodial interrogation. 4 Nonetheless, the
Court explicitly refused to recognize its reliance on the fifth
1' 45
amendment privilege as "an innovation in our jurisprudence.'

Rather, the Court characterized its holding as "an explication of
basic rights that are enshrined in our Constitution-that 'No person . . .shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself.' ,146

It is easy to fault Warren's opinion. In contrast to the lengthy
compilation of police interrogation strategies (largely illustrated by
reference to the standard police manuals, thus exaggerating the intensity and sophistication of police practices generally), the section
of the sixty page opinion that attempted to ground the holding in
precedent was thin. In all, Warren cited as precedent three cases
incorporating the fifth amendment privilege against the states,
none of which concerned custodial interrogation. Warren also cited
Escobedo, which had been decided entirely on sixth amendment
grounds.
The Court's objections to police interrogation ran deep. Its
concern was not primarily with the third degree, which was conceded to be "undoubtedly the exception now,"'14

7

or with the his-

toric problem of reliability-only in a footnote does the Court
mention that "[i]nterrogation procedures may . . .give rise to a
false confession.' 1 48 It was custodial interrogation itself, apart from

its duration or intensity or the tactics employed, that was vexatious. The Court explained: "An individual swept from familiar
surroundings into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic
forces, and subjected to

. .

.techniques of persuasion

. . .

cannot

142. Id. at 475. In dissent, Justice White predicted that when the government sought
to demonstrate waiver, it would confront a "severe, if not impossible burden of proof." Id. at
536 (White, J., dissenting).
143. See supra note 50.
144. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
145. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 442.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 447.
148. Id. at 455 n.24.
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be otherwise than under compulsion to speak. ' 149 Offensive police
practices were a natural, indeed inevitable, outgrowth of incommunicado interrogation: "Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement . . . from the defendant can truly be the
150
product of his free choice.
If a suspect, without encouragement from the police, volun5
teered a statement of guilt, the statement would be admissible; '
the coercion inherent in arrest and detention alone was not so momentous as to preclude it. But once a question was asked-"Where
were you last night?" "Do you own a shotgun?" or "Will you tell
us your version?"-any response would be barred unless the police
had administered the warnings and obtained an informed waiver of
the rights conferred.' 5 2
The Miranda majority thus viewed the arrested suspect from
a different perspective. Whereas earlier Supreme Court decisions
envisioned a hardy suspect, unwilling to confess to a murder and
able to resist police admonitions for hours without having his will
overborne, the Miranda Court saw the very fact of custodial questioning as a grave threat to "rational judgment" that induced the
"abdication of the constitutional privilege.' 153 Whereas prior opinions defined the central problem in criminal constitutional law as
striking the right balance between respect for the autonomy of the
individual and concern for the protection of the general public, the
Court in Miranda assumed a radical posture, treating the constitutional bar against compulsory self-incrimination as absolute. The
Miranda Court posed new questions: How can we promote the assertion of the privilege in the police station? How can we ensure its
exercise?
The Court's answer to these questions is now well known:
"The presence of counsel . . . [is] the adequate protective device
. . .to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege. His presence would insure that statements
made in the government-established atmosphere are not the prod149.

Id. at 461.

150. Id. at 458.
151. Id. at 478.
152. Cf. id. at 533-34 (White, J., dissenting) (noting dissatisfaction with the majority's
conclusion that the answer to such questions would be deemed compelled unless warnings
had been given); H. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 271 (1967) (noting dissatisfaction with the Miranda majority's establishment of a conclusive presumption in favor of finding all answers
compelled if given without a prior warning).

153. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 465.
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uct of compulsion.'
No one can be sure whether it was the Court's intent to eliminate all, or nearly all, custodial interrogation or even whether the
majority of five shared a common intention. Certainly the Court
had been put on notice that "any lawyer worth his salt will tell the
suspect in no uncertain terms to make no statement to police
under any circumstances.' 55 But the Court may not have accepted
these predictions at face value,' 56 or it may have preferred the

more equivocal projections of defense counsel.1 57 Most likely, as
naive as it now appears, the Court expected the presence of counsel at the station house to be routine and the waiver of rights extraordinary. 58 The Court probably imagined that the typical suspect advised of his rights would elect to exercise them. He would
choose to speak to counsel rather than to police, and counsel would

154. Id. at 466.
155. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
156. Cf. Enker & Elsen, supra note 115, at 68 ("[O]ur experience indicates that counsel would gain no advantage for his client by advising him to confess to the police which he
could not gain later on in his negotiations with the prosecutor.").
For a similar view, see the illuminating article by Bernard Weisberg written in 1962
when he was General Counsel to the American Civil Liberties Union, Illinois Division:
Since silence inevitably invites suspicion, it is not unreasonable to suppose that in
many cases where the suspect is innocent his lawyer will advise him to answer questions in order to clear himself as quickly as possible and assist the police. Moreover,
the lawyer's advice may be different if he is present at the interrogation. It is one thing
to dispense general advice to a suspect from whose interrogation the lawyer will be
barred and quite a different matter to counsel silence or answers to particular questions when the lawyer hears them as they are asked.
But there seems no reason to doubt that counsel will ordinarily advise silence
where he learns that his client is guilty or, although innocent, endangered by compromising circumstances and probably also when he lacks sufficient information to form a
considered judgment. This would make the work of the police more difficult. Introducing counsel into police station questioning would have the practical effect of giving life
to the privilege against self-incrimination prior to the judicial stage of criminal proceedings. From the police point of view, it would have the effect of making interrogation after arrest impossible in the very cases in which it is most likely to help them find
the offender.
Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View, in POLICE POWER
AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 153, 179 (C. Sowle ed. 1962) (footnote omitted).
157. See Brief for Petitioner at 45, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), cited in R.
MEDALiE, supra note 16, at 68 ("As a practical matter, we cannot know with assurance
whether amplification of the right to counsel in the interrogation period will severely handicap the police; we end by trading opinion."); cf. Comment, An HistoricalArgument for the
Right to Counsel During Police Interrogation,73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1049 (1964) ("[O]ur conclusions favor counsel during interrogation even if the result is the end of interrogation. But
the fact that most prosecutors do not now interrogate a man once he has obtained counsel
does not mean that they would find interrogation with counsel useless.") (footnotes
omitted).
158. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475; id. at 536 (White, J., dissenting).
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ordinarily be provided to the indigent as an alternative to foregoing interrogation altogether. Once summoned, counsel might "advise his client not to talk to police until he has an opportunity to
investigate the case, or he may wish to be present during any po'159
lice questioning.
One can imagine the Miranda warnings as serving a function
similar to the caution printed on cigarette packages. The smoker is
advised of the risks he is taking, but he does not get the message
until the package is in hand when the impulse for gratification is
strongest. The warning is thus ineffective in most cases. But the
Miranda Court did not intend to create an ineffective prophylactic. Its vision was not of gesture or ritual. It sought to deter suspects from confessing. It interpreted the fifth amendment privilege
not merely as conferring a power in the suspect-to talk or not, to
insist on counsel or not-but as stating a preference for noncooperation with the police.16 ° The warnings, fairly administered, were
designed to impress on the suspect that he placed himself in jeopardy by answering any questions. They were supposed to be the
equivalent of the police telling the suspect, "Look, Joe, you had
better get a lawyer." Fairly administered, they would render "most
police questioning ineffective."1 61
Was it now wrong for the police to urge a person to confess or
for counsel to allow or advise his client to do so? It would seem
SO.162

The Chief Justice's opinion treats confession as an act of

poor judgment by a vulnerable person outmaneuvered by the po159.

Id. at 480.

160. This view was most clearly expressed by Justice Black during the course of oral
argument in Miranda:
Mr. Nelson [Attorney General of Arizona]: [T]he practical effect of introducing counsel
at the interrogation stage is . . . to stop the interrogation ....
Mr. Justice Black: Isn't that. . . the. . . object of the 5th Amendment which says, he
shall not be compelled to give testimony against himself? Is there any difference, for

our purposes, of the two, what the lawyer tells him and what the 5th Amendment tells
him?
R M DALIE, supra note 16, at 94.
161. L. WEINREB, supra note 5, at 151.
162. If an attorney represents a client who wishes to confess and plead guilty, must
the attorney try to talk him out of it? Is it "ineffective assistance of counsel" to acquiesce in

the client's decision if the client has an arguable defense? See People v. Claudio, 59 N.Y.2d
556, 453 N.E.2d 500, 466 N.Y.S.2d 271 (1983) (attorney criticized for advising client to sur-

render and confess when he knew that the prosecutor did not have enough evidence to prosecute); see also Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALF. L. REv. 652,

663-64 (1981) (characterizing an attorney's exhortations to his client to stand trial as "conscientious advice" even though the client, "a murder defendant [had] told him, 'I couldn't
possibly plead not guilty. I did it.' ").
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lice. 0 s In a draft opinion, Warren had emphasized the racial character of the third degree and our history of "police violence upon
minority groups. 1 64 But at the suggestion of Justice Brennan, who
wondered "if it [was] appropriate ... to turn police brutality into

a racial problem," ' the reference to blacks and the South was
omitted, and the overall accent was, as Brennan suggested, on poverty: "If anything characterizes the group [of criminal suspects] it
is poverty more than race." ' 6 With this focus, the offender became
the victim.
B. The Impropriety of Warning the Suspect
Most of the controversy that followed Miranda centered on
the right to counsel at the station. Scant attention was directed to
the requirement that the police inform a suspect that he had a
right to remain silent and that anything he said could be used
against him as evidence in court.16 7 In part, this neglect arose from

a general impression that these warnings would not have much
consequence. Justice Harlan's dissent glossed over them as "minor
obstructions."" 6 Even the police offered no protest; moreover,
many agencies, including the prestigious Federal Bureau of Investigation, already required its officers to administer a similar caution; the English police had done so since 1848.169 Finally, many
believed that requiring the police to inform a suspect of his right
to silence and of the consequences of his confession was only fair.
Nonetheless, the propriety of making the state responsible for
informing the suspect of his rights is not evident. It is not easy to
explain why fair play requires the police to warn a suspect of the
danger in answering truthfully. As John Stuart Mill asked,
"Whence all this dread of truth?" 170 Requiring an officer to tell a
163. The Chief Justice wrote that interrogation "exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455. According to a
recent biographer, Chief Justice Warren understood criminals as persons who "might have
turned to crime because of disadvantage or out of degradation." G. WHrIE, supra note 135,

at 265. The Chief Justice recognized that "the Court could do nothing about the deplorable
conditions of urban America," but felt that "it could at least ensure that the process of
criminal justice did not add to the degraded status of those participating in it." Id.
164. B. SCHWARTZ, SuPER CHIEF 591 (1983).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Miranda,384 U.S. at 444.
168. Id. at 516.
169. L. LEvy, supra note 15, at 375.
170. S. HOOK, COMMON SENSE AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 59 (1957) (quoting John Stuart Mil).
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murder or rape suspect that he need not answer the officer's questions and that, if he does, he might suffer the consequences seems
altogether too charitable. It suggests an ambivalence toward the
suspect and his deed. Giving the warning is not a neutral act
designed merely to place the suspect in an independent position to
decide whether to take responsibility for his wrongdoing. A police
warning provides information with a purpose. If delivered faithfully, it will encourage the suspect to withhold information.'
One need not agree with J.F. Stephen that "the proper attitude of mind toward criminals is not long-suffering charity but
open enmity"'7 2 to ask why such generosity is called for.17 3 If condemnation and punishment are appropriate responses to rape and
murder, then paternalistic counseling is inappropriate. To expect
truthful answers from a suspect is too much to ask; most persons
would not perceive or honor an obligation to respond candidly.
Nonetheless, the government has good reason to make the
174
inquiry.
In related contexts we do not encourage persons to withhold
information. Judge Friendly observed, "Every hour of the day people are being asked to explain their conduct to parents, employers,
and teachers."' 7 5 Sidney Hook similarly commented, "Let any sensible person ask himself whether he would hire a secretary, nurse,
171. In some cases, however, a warning will be misperceived by the subject as a gesture of friendliness and invite rather than foreclose communication. T. GuTHEIL & P. APP.BAUM, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 289-90 (1982).
172. 1 J.F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW IN ENGLAND

432 (1883).

173. Cf. Robinson, supra note 28, at 412 ("[I]t is one thing for society to establish a
policy of not applying coercive sanctions against behavior and quite another to urge it. For
example, one may grant a 'right' to kill to prevent the escape of a felon without promoting
its exercise whenever possible.").
174. L. WEINREB, supra note 5, at 161. That questions may trigger a suspect's conscience troubles some commentators and judges. See, for example, the dissenting opinions of
Justices Marshall and Stevens in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980). For a contrary
view, see Frey, Modern Police InterrogationLaw: The Wrong Road Taken, 42 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 731, 732 (1981) ("I find it extraordinary that three members of the United States Supreme Court (and many legal commentators) discern in the constitution . . . a principle
that prohibits police from appealing to the conscience of a person suspected of having committed a serious crime."); cf. Johnson, The Return of the "ChristianBurial Speech" Case,
32 EMORY L.J. 350, 381 (1983) (noting that when the interrogator in Brewer v. Williams, 430
U.S. 387 (1977), made a plea to the suspect's conscience, he was asking the suspect "to do
the only decent and honorable thing: to reveal where he had hidden the body [of the victim], so the police could recover it and return it to the grieving family for burial. Perhaps
the police ought not to be allowed to make such an appeal to a suspect in their custody, but
...somebody ought to do it.").
175. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional
Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 671, 680 (1968).
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or even a babysitter for his children, if she refused to reply to a
question bearing upon the proper execution of her duties with1 a6
response equivalent to the privilege against self-incrimination.'
Professor Mayers offered this hypothetical:
Suppose that evidence were laid before [a professor] warranting suspicion
that one of his students, called upon to submit an essay to satisfy the requirements of the faculty, had employed another person to prepare the essay and

had submitted it as his own. Would the [professor] regard it as an essential
and inherent cruelty to demand of the student that he explain away the evidence? Would not the [professor] regard the student's refusal to offer an exof itself sufficient ground for his expulsion from school-a fearplanation as 177
ful penalty?

Of course, a man suspected of murder faces a greater penalty
than a student risking expulsion, but does this factor support an
argument for or against a warning of a right to remain silent? If
the police were to issue a warning that reflected the common understanding of the implications of silence in the face of an accusation, the suspect would be told something like this: "We cannot
compel you to answer our questions, but your failure to provide us
with information concerning this matter may have a bad effect on
your case in general.'1 7 8 The exercise of the right to silence might
not invariably lead to adverse inferences, but in many cases, perhaps most, a person could be expected to protest his innocence and
give an account of himself rather than stand on his rights.7 9 The
S. HooK, supra note 170, at 73.
177. L. MAYERS, supra note 26, at 168; cf. McCormick, Law and the Future:Evidence,
51 Nw. U.L. REV. 218, 222 (1956) ("[The privilege] goes beyond the demands of ordinary
morality, which sees nothing wrong in asking a man, for adequate reason, about particular
misdeeds of which he has been suspected and charged.").
In a 1962 Symposium, Professor Bratholm reported that in Norway
the police have no duty to draw the attention of a suspect to the fact that he need not
make a statement or that everything he says may be taken down and used as evidence
against him. On the contrary, if the suspect declines to make a statement, the examining officer can draw his attention to the fact that his refusal could be considered as a
circumstance which weighs against him. The same applies if the accused refuses to
make a statement in court.
Bratholm, Police Interrogationin Norway, in POLICE POWER AND INDIIDUAL FREEDOM 211
(C. Sowle ed. 1962).
178. A proposal to give this type of warning was made by the Criminal Law Revision
Committee of the Home Office in England in 1972, but, after much debate, it was not
adopted. CRIMINAL LAW REvisION COMMITTEE, ELEVENTH REPORT, EVIDENCE (General Cmnd.
4991) 24-26 (1972); cf. Gerstein, The Self-Incrimination Debate in Great Britian, 27 AM. J.
COMP. L. 81 (1979) (exploring the debate surrounding the rejection of this proposal for the
light that the debate sheds on the assumptions underlying the right to silence).
179. An observer of 60 interrogations in Brighton, England concluded that "the innocent ... do not exercise their right to silence; they talk, usually volubly." B. IRVING, POLICE
176.

INTERROGATION: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH

153 (1980).
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right that is being asserted, it must be recalled, is the right to
withhold incriminating evidence, not evidence. However unpleasant it may be to testify, in the absence of privilege, a citizen ordinarily is required to do so. As Jeremy Bentham long ago wrote,
"Evidence is the basis of justice: exclude evidence, you exclude justice." 180 A person may prefer not to respond to questions about a
burglary or automobile accident he witnessed, but the law has
never countenanced such reticence. Only the person who seeks to
deny the state damaging material about himself is protected, and
we provide protection not because we admire the man who stands
silent, but because we do not wish to give the authorities the power
to coerce testimony.
From the suspect's point of view, the privilege has undoubted
appeal. It fosters self-preservation. But whether silence is a
right, 181 or something less worthy and more instinctive, there
seems nothing admirable in standing silent in the face of a criminal accusation.18 2 The suspect who is told, "We are investigating
180.
181.

5 J. BENTHAM, supra note 123, at 1.
See, e.g., Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and ConstitutionalRight, 23 Whs &
MARY L. REV. 15 (1981).
182. In this connection, Justice Schaefer wrote:
The chief difficulty with [the privilege against self-incrimination] is that it runs
counter to ordinary standards of morality. Parents try hard to inculcate in their children the simple virtues of truth and responsibility. Yet in the enforcement of criminal
law a different set of values has come to prevail. Perhaps to prepare our children for
adult life we should carefully instruct them never to answer any questions if the answers may reveal misconduct-but I don't think so.
W. SCHAEFER, supra note 16, at 59. A recent study suggests that parents accept Justice
Schaefer's principles of child-rearing even in the context of police interrogation of their children. T. GRISSO, supra note 47, at 120. A survey of 752 middle and upper-middle class white
parents revealed that the great majority felt that their children should be required to answer questions put to them when they are suspected of a crime: "[O]ver half of the parents
expressly disagreed with the idea that juveniles should be allowed to avoid incriminating
themselves by withholding information. The majority of parents . . . did not support the
protective privilege for juveniles which the Supreme Court ruled in In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967), must be provided." Id. at 175. When asked how they would advise their children to
respond to police questions, parents answered: "He should tell the truth," "Tell the police
whatever they want to know," and "If he's guilty, own up-if he's not, there's nothing to
hide." Id. at 180. Such parental advice was motivated both by moral reasons-it's the right
thing to do-and by strategic ones-cooperation with the police was felt likely to result in
more lenient treatment. Id. at 180-81.
The same study also indicates that many juveniles believe that if they admit their guilt
to their lawyer, the lawyer must either inform the judge or enter a plea of guilty to the
offense. Id. at 120. This misconception may reveal more than juveniles' lack knowledge of
their legal rights and of the legal system; it suggests that if a person is taught that he should
be held responsible for his own misconduct, and that others should not conceal wrongdoing,
these moral precepts may compete with and override more specific information about legal
rules. This also may explain why many juveniles believe that it is wrong to refuse to answer
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the murder of your wife. What can you tell us about this matter?"
and remains silent is not heroic; he is merely covering up. Only
when viewed as a symbolic statement of the limits to truthseeking
when the fact finding methods are demeaning does the right to silence justify the high praise that has been showered upon it. 1 3 But
when viewed from the perspective of the accused, it is difficult to
see "just how the stature of the individual man gains in 'dignity
and importance' by his maintaining silence in the face of grave evidence,' 84 unless one takes the position that the government was
wrong to ask.
All this is not to say that a suspect's knowledge of his right to
silence should be ignored. Proof that the suspect knows his rights
is relevant to a determination that his statements were not coerced. Knowledge that one is not compelled to answer may fortify
the will; and the fact that the interrogator provided the suspect
with the information about the suspect's rights evidences the government's awareness of the limitations on its inquiry.185 These considerations make sense in the determination of voluntariness, and
the Court on several occasions has measured the suspect's awarea judge's question: "If I'm in court, I have to tell the truth. ... [W]hen a judge asks you
what you done, you have to tell him even if you don't want to." Id. at 124.
183. Professor Griswold has called the privilege "one of the great landmarks in man's
struggle to make himself civilized," E. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 7 (1955);
"an ever-present reminder of our belief in the importance of the individual," id. at 81; and
"a symbol of our highest aspirations," id.
184. L. MAYERS, supra note 26, at 167. Professor Mayers adds:
Neither is it self-evident that there is anything repugnant to civilized or decent conduct, or any invasion of the citizen's dignity and importance, in the community's requiring him to respond to orderly inquiry, even at the risk of disclosing his own complicity in wrongdoing. Law observance and law enforcement are the essence of a
civilized community; and only by dispassionate and thorough investigation of breaches
of law can this civilized order be sustained. Surely there is nothing uncivilized, nothing
expressive of the unlimited power of the state, in demanding of every citizen, under
proper safeguards against abuse, that he answer proper questions put to him in a
proper manner by constituted authority. To some indeed, such a requirement may
seem itself an essential of a civilized order.
Id. at 167-68.
For an extended argument that Miranda should be read to emphasize the value of "free
and rational choice" of the suspect as an "independent constitutional good," see Shrock,
Welsh & Collins, InterrogationalRights: Reflections on Miranda v. Arizona, 52 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1, 41-51 (1978). The authors argue that there is an enormous difference in dignity
"between the person who can only say, 'I won't talk,' and one who knows enough to say, 'I
stand on my right not to talk."' Id. at 50.

185. Enker & Elsen, supra note 115, at 62; cf. P. DEVLIN,

THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION

37 (1958) (finding that the warning serves to put the suspect on notice that the
police are at "war" with him and that they do not have the "right, legal or moral, to further
help from" him).
IN ENGLAND
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ness of his rights in deciding whether his statement was admissible. 8" In the fifth amendment context, however, the automatic
suppression of an incriminating statement solely because of a failure to advise a suspect who in fact knows his rights seems
excessive.
When inquiring into the propriety of requiring disclosure of
the suspect's right to silence, one should not start with the premise
that a person cannot waive a constitutional right if he is unaware
of its existence. Ordinarily, our legal system does not excuse an
individual for ignorance of his rights and obligations. Routinely,
individuals who make decisions based on imperfect knowledge of
the law or the facts must suffer the consequences. In the lawyerclient context, for example, a client who wishes to fire his attorney
should know that he might incur additional liability if the discharge is wrongful, but ignorance of this rule does not relieve him
of liability. He remains bound to his agreement. Moreover, the attorney is not obligated to advise the client of this potential liability, even though without such counseling the client probably will
remain ignorant of it. In some situations the law does impose a
responsibility to disclose information, but these characteristically
relate to transactions in which a failure to disclose would result in
a grossly unfair bargain. In these circumstances, no societal interest is advanced by allowing the party with superior knowledge to
bind another party to an agreement that he would not have made
had the relevant facts been known.
In the fourth amendment area, the Supreme Court has held
that a suspect may validly waive his right to refuse to allow the
police to conduct a warrantless search of his premises or property
even though he is unaware of his constitutional right to deny the
police access. The government need not prove that there was "an
187
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right"'
by the suspect. The government need only prove that the consent
was given "voluntarily" under the totality of the circumstances.' 8 8
The Court has stated that this test represents a balance between
two competing concerns: "the legitimate need for such searches
and the equally important requirement of assuring the absence of
coercion."' 8 9 By adopting this balance, the Supreme Court refused
186. See, e.g., Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958). For additional citations, see
King, supra note 101, at 486-88.
187. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
188. Id. at 248-49.
189. Id. at 227.
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to follow the lead of Miranda. The Mirandaapproach-that a suspect is irrebuttably presumed to be ignorant of his rights unless
the police inform him of them and that such ignorance renders any
statement made in response to questions coerced-ignores the
competing values at stake. 9 '
Thus, the Miranda approach reflects a bias against self-accusation on principle. This bias has roots in the desire to treat suspects equally. Suspects who do not know their rights, or do not
assert them, as a consequence of some handicap-poverty, lack of
education, emotional instability-should not, it is felt, fare worse
than more accomplished suspects who know and have the capacity
to assert their rights. This "equal protection" appeal finds its way
repeatedly into judicial pinions and legal commentary. In Miranda itself, Chief Justice Warren referred approvingly to the Cali9 1 which
fornia Supreme Court's decision in People v. Dorado,1
stressed that "the defendant who does not realize his rights under
the law and who therefore does not request counsel is the very defendant who most needs counsel.' 1 92 A few years earlier, Professor
Beisel similarly argued that only the "frightened, the insecure, the
weak, and untrained, the bewildered, the stupid, the naive, the
credulous" confess.'9 3 More recently, Professor Kamisar asserted
that the pre-Mirandavoluntariness test favored the more sophisti190. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 n.12 (1981) (characterizing "the balance of competing interests" as "the key principle of the Fourth Amendment").
In a recent fifth amendment decision, the Court emphasized that it "has never embraced the theory that a defendant's ignorance of the full consequences of his decisions
vitiates their voluntariness." Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1297 (1985) (holding that the
privilege against self-incrimination does not require the suppression of a confession, made
after proper Miranda warnings and a valid waiver of rights, solely because the police had
obtained a prior unwarned admission from the suspect). The significance of this assertion is
unclear because elsewhere in the opinion the Court stressed that it was "in no way" retreating "from the bright line rule of Miranda" requiring that warnings be administered in every
case of custodial interrogation. Id. at 1298.
191. 40 Cal. Rptr. 264, 394 P.2d 952 (1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 937, vacated, 62 Cal.
2d 338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, cert. denied, 381 U.S. 946 (1965).
192. 40 Cal. Rptr. at 268, 384 P.2d at 956. Even the National District Attorneys' Association in oral argument on Miranda conceded that "if we are talking about equality between the rich and the poor we are striving for a worthy object" and reserved its criticism
for what has been labeled here the game or sporting theory: "If we are talking about equality between the policemen and the criminal, we are on dangerous ground." R. MEDALIE,
supra note 16, at 101.
193. A. BEISEL, CONTROL OVER ILLEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: ROLE OF
THE SUPREME COURT 106 (1955); cf. Special Project, supra note 47, at 1610 (finding that a
lawyer's presence at the station house "would insure that the weaker, less experienced suspect who might have confessed will not be penalized during bargaining in comparison with
the professional or sophisticated").
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cated suspects because it probably did not permit greater-than-average pressures to be applied against stronger-than-average
19
suspects. 4
To the extent that these observations are true-and they seem
true enough' 9 5 -they suggest two distinct remedies. One would be
to make it more difficult to convict those who are most vulnerable;
the other would be to develop ways to bring those hardier, more
knowledgeable persons-the hired killer, the calculating embezzler,
the experienced burglar-to justice. The critics-Kamisar, Beisel,
and many others-have preferred the former. They do not see the
lack of stamina and professionalism of the suspect as conferring a
benefit on society by facilitating the identification of
wrongdoers. 96
But guilt is personal. 1 97 That another, equally guilty, person
got away with murder because of some fortuitous factor-he was
more experienced in dealing with the police, he had a poorly developed sense of guilt, he had a smart lawyer, he knew his rights-or
even because of discrimination, does not make the more vulnerable
murderer less guilty. To hold otherwise is to confuse justice with
equality. "Both are desirable. However, neither can replace the
other."1 9 8 Since sophisticated suspects ordinarily will choose not to
confess (with or without knowledge of their rights), "[t]o strive for
194. Y. KAMISAR, supra note 80, at 23-24. Professor Schulhofer argues that the real
objection is not "based on equal protection doctrine," but rather that "we do (and should)
find it unseemly for government officials systematically to seek out and take advantage of
the psychological vulnerabilities of a citizen. Whether or not one considers such tactics necessary for effective law enforcement, they convey a feeling of manipulation and exploitation
of the weak by the powerful that many would tolerate with at best considerable reluctance."
SchuIhofer, supra note 80, at 872.
195. For example, a study of interrogation in the District of Columbia found that the
"typical defendant. . . is a young, single, Negro, male recidivist of low socio-economic status characterized by low income, low educational attainment, high unemployment, poor job
status, borderline overcrowded living accommodations, and a dearth of voluntary affiliations." Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, CustodialPolice Interrogationin Our Nation's Capital:
The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1347, 1357 (1968).
196. Nicholas Katzenbach, former United States Attorney General, stated, "I never
understood why the gangster should be made the model and all others raised, in the name of
equality, to his level of success in suppressing evidence." Bazelon, Equal Treatment in the
Enforcement of the Criminal Law: The Bazelon-Katzenbach Letters, 56 J. CRiM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCL 498, 502 (1965).
197. Van den Haag, Comment on John Kaplan's "Administering Capital Punishment", 36 U. FLA. L. REv. 193, 199 (1984).
198. Id. See also van den Haag's arguments on "equal injustice and unequal justice."
Van den Haag, Refuting Reiman and Nathanson, 14 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 165, 174 (1985); cf.
L. WEINREB, supra note 5, at 5 (arguing that justice is obtained by treating all like criminals
equally).
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equality. . . is to strive to eliminate confessions.' ' 19 9 Thus, the Miranda Court elected to let one person get away with murder because of the advantage possessed by another.

VI. Miranda IN
A.

OPERATION

The InterrogationProcess

At the time Miranda was argued, the worst practices of the
1940's and 1950's-prolonged detention, relay questioning, denial
of food or sleep, threats of physical harm-were disappearing. In
their place were gentler methods, more tolerable and less likely to
induce false confession. The police also were showing a greater
willingness to forego questioning when the suspect was insistent or
the crime not that serious.2 00
In most cases today, the police dispense with interrogation or
carry it out in a desultory manner because the offense is too minor,
other evidence is ample, or, in the larger cities where crime is heavily concentrated, police resources are too limited to allow questioning in all instances in which it might prove useful. When the police
engage in sustained questioning, it is confined to the more serious
cases and conducted by the more skilled officers, those from the
specialized branches of the detective division.
The interrogator is like an actor playing a dramatic role. To
induce a confession, an act that ordinarily runs against inclination
and interest, he manipulates and deceives the suspect.2 1 He plays
upon the stress inherent in the arrest and creates added conditions
of tension. He exhibits confidence, asks direct questions, reasserts
his position in the face of denials, maintains steady eye contact,
and sits a bit too close. He pretends to be friendly (or unfriendly),
to sympathize with the suspect or condemn the victim, to believe
in something that he does not believe in, to insist on the guilt of
199. Grano, supra note 80, at 914.
200. For example, observers of interrogation in New Haven observed, "The detectives
Interrogations
seemed friendly or businesslike more often than hostile and relentless ....
were seldom long, and the detectives frequently offered the suspects such amenities as food,
drink, or cigarettes." Special Project, supra note 47, at 1536. "If the suspect categorically
refused to answer any questions, the interview usually ended almost immediately." Id. at
1538. "Most of the interrogations were short, averaging about 30 minutes of actual questioning." Id. at 1541. "We saw no undue physical force used by the detectives." Id. at 1549.
201. Emphasizing the abnormality of the suspect-police confrontation, Inbau and Reid
in their famous textbook on interrogation insist that "deceit is inherent in every question
asked of the suspect, and in every statement made by the interrogator." F. INBAU & J. REID,
supra note 33, at 96; cf. R. ARTHER & R. CAPUTO, INTERROGATION FOR INVESTIGATORS 147
(1959) (describing different ways of getting a youth to confess to a crime).
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the suspect when he is uncertain about that guilt, to assert that
evidence exists (fingerprints, eyewitnesses, an accomplice's confession) when it does not exist.
Ultimately, to be effective when the suspect continues to deny
his guilt, the interrogator must evoke a felt response in his adversary. What he touches may be simply the instinct for self-preservation or the desire for a better deal or for lenient treatment.2 0 2 It
may be the self-justification for misdeeds that usually exists in the
mind of a prisoner.20 3 It may be curiosity to know the extent of the
state's evidence. 0 4
On occasion, the interrogator may be able to strike something
deeper. When the suspect has internalized prevailing ethical standards or when he believes that robbery or assault is wrong, exhortations that he will feel better once he admits his error strike a
familiar chord. Guilt and contrition are then implicated: "Guilt is
something that separates us from others and confession and 'sharing' are means of assuaging it. ' ' 205 When these two feelings coa202. In some instances, the arrestee takes the initiative. "What can I do to get out of
this thing?" is not an uncommon question for an experienced offender who knows that the
police traffic in information about other offenses. See C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 228-29 (1978).
203. One commentator elaborated on how the interrogator could reach the suspect:
Suggest [to the subject] that there was a good reason for his having committed the
deed, that he has too much intelligence to have done it without rhyme or reason. In the
case of sex-crimes, explain that sex hunger is one of the strongest instincts motivating
our lives. In case of theft, suggest that the subject may have been hungry, or deprived
of the necessaries of life; or in homicide, that the victim had done him a great wrong
and probably had it coming to him. Be friendly and sympathetic and encourage him to
write out or relate the whole story-to clean up and start afresh.

C.D.

LEE, INSTRUMENTAL DETECTION OF DECEPTION,
SUASION 251 (Penguin ed. 1963).

cited in J. BROWN,

TECHNIQUES OF PER-

204. In his documentary of a family murder case, R. Levine described the interrogation process as follows:
[The detective] read Chuck [a suspect in a double-murder case] his rights from a standard form and was not at all surprised that Chuck agreed-indeed, seemed even anxious to talk to him, checking the appropriate box on the waiver and even writing, "Yes,
OK" beside it. One thing [he] always told rookie cops in his interrogation courses was
that guilty parties usually waive their right to remain silent, since they're so impatient
to learn how much the police already know.
R. LEVINE, BAD BLOOD: A FAMILY MURDER IN MARIN COUNTY 244 (1982); cf. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 480 (1981) (The suspect agreed to talk if permitted to hear a tape recording of a statement of his accomplice implicating both of them.).
205. J. BROWN, supra note 203, at 284. In a much diluted form, the identical process
can be seen at work in the routine of everyday life. Self-accusation as apology is an essential
agent for living amicably together. Think of the common occasion when a person who is
scheduled to meet a friend for lunch arrives 15 or 20 minutes late. If the tardiness is accompanied by explanation and apology, the friend is mollified and the lunch is likely to take
place as anticipated. By genuinely indicating regret over such lapses, we perform a healing
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lesce, the interrogation becomes not only a discomforting confrontation but a moral process.2 0 6
It was in this setting that the Miranda Court sought to encourage the suspect to secure a lawyer, or, at the least, to exercise
his right to silence. The Court chose the police as the bearers of
the good news: law enforcement officers were given the responsibility of informing the suspect of his constitutional rights.
Like requiring a convict to build his own place of confinement,
there was something mischievous about making the police the
act. However, if we only offer a halfhearted excuse or ignore the delinquency altogether, the
relationship is jeopardized. Our failure to show the appropriate contrition raises the possibility that our friend will avoid having lunch with us again or will harbor resentment. Similar examples abound in family life: the child who takes cookies when mother is away, the
teenager who surreptitiously uses the family sedan for a midnight cruise, the husband who
smokes on the sly after telling his wife he has quit. All these occurrences, once discovered,
present a problem that must be confronted if social harmony is to be restored. There may
have to be punishment-the child can have no sweets for a week, the teenager is denied
driving privileges temporarily-but such punishment is incidental to the main purpose of
reinstating the offender. Confession becomes the vehicle for getting back together. Punishment without confession would not achieve the same purpose (nor, I suspect, would forgiveness). Just as churchgoing provides the opportunity for corporate admission of wrongdoing,
so does the experience of everyday life provide occasions for confession. As Bonhoeffer put
it: "In confession the break-through to community takes place." D. BONHOEFFER, LIFE ToGETHER

112 (1954); cf. D.

BONHOEFFER,

supra note 18, at 261-64.

In a related connection, Professors Wilson and Kelling speak of "untended behavior" in
the community, the process by which one broken window becomes many:
[I]f a window in a building is broken and is left unrepaired,all the rest of the windows
will soon be broken. This is as true in nice neighborhoods as in run-down ones. Window-breaking does not necessarily occur on a large scale because some areas are inhabited by determined window-breakers whereas others are populated by window-lovers;
rather, one unrepaired broken window is a signal that no one cares."

Wilson & Kelling, Broken Windows, THE

ATLANTic MONTHLY,

Mar., 1982, at 31.

In much the same way that the community has a stake in prompt repair of the physical
damage, it has an interest in detecting the offender. Investigation manifests its concern that
such derelictions matter. But the goal is not merely detection but also reformation of the
offender. When the wrongdoer exhibits himself as a person who understands that he has
offended others by his behavior, then his presence, far from being a sign of social breakdown, operates to reinforce the community in its orderly ways.
We have, as Wilson and Kelling point out, "difficulty thinking about such matters, not
simply because the ethical and legal issues are so complex but because we have become
accustomed to thinking of the law in essentially individualistic terms." Id. at 36. But there
is a community perspective that needs to be added to the calculus.
206. Guilt may be more of a factor in producing confession than the Miranda Court
thought. In the study of custodial interrogation in the District of Columbia following Miranda, 38% of those who gave statements to the police "stated that they had volunteered
the statements without being interrogated." Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, supra note 195, at
1366. In New Haven, however, "[o]nly six suspects clearly wanted to confess regardless of
their rights." Special Project, supra note 47, at 1576. Of course, in some cases the willingness to confess is induced not from remorse but from a cool-headed knowledge that the
evidence of guilt is strong and the police may show leniency in exchange for confession.
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harbingers of good tidings to those they had just arrested. The police not surprisingly saw Miranda as more than simply an undesirable change in the rules; it was a public humiliation, a "slap at
policemen everywhere. 202 But this reaction was transient. The enduring consequence of the Court's decision to make the police couriers of fifth amendment rights was to stifle the exercise of those
rights. As Professor Edward Barrett asked: "[I]s it the duty of the
police to persuade the subject to talk or persuade him not to talk?
They cannot be expected to do both."210 Professor Kamisar similarly asserted that "when we expect the police dutifully" to advise
a suspect of his rights, "we demand too much of even our best
'20 9
officers.

As a logical proposition, assigning the police responsibility for
advising the suspect was inconsistent with the overarching rationale of Miranda. The purpose of the warnings was "to dispel the
compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings."21 0 But, as Justice
White pointed out in his dissent, "[I]f the defendant may not now
answer without a warning a question such as 'Where were you last
night?' without having his answer be a compelled one, how can the
Court ever accept his negative answer to the question of whether
he wants to consult . . . counsel . . .?,,211
In imposing this obligation on the police, the Court rejected
much of the advice it received. Both the American Civil Liberties
Union and the National District Attorneys' Association opposed
the police warning. 21 2 The prosecutors felt that the police might
"stretch the truth" regarding their full compliance with Miranda
requirements, and, quoting Lord Devlin, asserted that "it is the
general habit of the police never to admit to the slightest departure from correctness. 2 1 3 But beyond this concern, the district attorneys were puzzled over how the police should respond to a suspect who, after being appropriately advised of his constitutional
207. Special Project, supra note 47, at 1610.
208. Brief for Edward L. Barrett, Jr., as Amicus Curiae at 9, People v. Dorado, 62 Cal.
2d 338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1965) (on rehearing), cited in Y. KAMISAR, supra

note 80, at 85.
209.

Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouse and Mansions of American Criminal
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 35-36 (D. Howard ed. 1965).
210. Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966).
211. Id. at 536 (White, J., dissenting).
212. Brief for American Civil Liberties Union, as Amicus Curiae at 25-26, Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (citing the Brief for the National District Attorneys' Association, as Amicus Curiae at 14, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
213. Id. at 26.

Procedure, in
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rights, inquires, "Should I get a lawyer? Why do I need a lawyer?
What will a lawyer do for me?"2 14 The prosecuters wondered
whether the interrogator should act in the criminal's best interest
by advising him to get an attorney or whether the interrogator
should proceed in the government's interest by convincing the accused that an attorney was unnecessary. 215 If a police officer responded honestly to such inquiries from the suspect, he would say,
"Look, Joe, you ought to get yourself an attorney before answering
any questions. Otherwise, you might inadvertently incriminate
yourself or provide evidence that you committed a more serious
crime than we would otherwise prove."
It is clear, however, that no officer "worth his salt" would respond so honestly, and no police department could operate efficiently with officers who saw their primary obligation as safeguarding the constitutional rights of the suspect.21 6 Instead, the early
empirical studies on the influence of Miranda clearly document
that, where opportunity permitted, post-Miranda interrogators
chose to "persuade the subject to talk" rather than "persuade him
not to talk. ' 217 The studies reveal that, contrary to the intent of
214. R. MEDALIE, supra note 16, at 63 (citing the Brief for the National District Attorneys' Association, as Amicus Curiae at 13, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
215. See id.
216. We know from observations of another stressful relationship, that of doctor and
patient, that it is often difficult for the doctor to separate his interests from those of the
patient. Although there is no theoretical conflict of interest-both parties want to do what is
best for the patient-in practice the doctor may find it difficult to provide an anxious patient with enough assistance to enable the patient to reach his own judgment respecting
treatment. Where disabling illness is involved, the patient may want to fall back on the
doctor's expertise, and the doctor may want to give the patient more reassurance than
events warrant. "Transference feelings become more intense when persons are. . . beset by
fears and anxieties." J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 143 (1984). In the
police-suspect relationship, which by its nature is adversarial, the tendency of the officer is
to exploit rather than allay the "fears and anxieties" of the suspect. The officer will choose
that course that best fits his own needs (solving the crime) rather than that which best
serves the suspect's interest (concealing the crime).
217. Brief for Edward L. Barrett, Jr., supra note 208, at 9.
Leiken, in his study on interrogations in Colorado, describes police motivation as
follows:
The interrogators uniformly appeared to be concerned with accomplishing two goals.
The first was to get the suspect to sign the waiver provision after warning him of his
rights, and the second was to get him to talk whenever possible. A few of them indicated that if a suspect is reluctant to sign the form or to talk, then it would be permissible to give him some mild encouragement to do so.
Leiken, supra note 47, at 37.
In New Haven, the "police told suspects.. . that they would be 'worse off' if they did
not talk, played down the seriousness of the crime, swore at the suspects, and made
promises of leniency." Special Project, supra note 47, at 1531. A detective by his manner or
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the Court, suspects more often have surrendered their rights than
exercised them. These studies conclude that Mirandahas done little to promote the exercise of the right to silence or the right to
have counsel at the police station.1
To be truly protective of the suspect's decision to invoke or
forego his rights would require making the right to counsel
nonwaivable, so that prior professional advice would always be
available, or granting the suspect a cooling-off period.21 9 In civil
law applications, a mandatory cooling-off period provides a decisionmaker time to change his mind. It provides an opportunity to
reflect on the commitment at hand and allows the hasty, emotional, or pressured decision to be undone. Other instances of paternalism in the civil law-the prohibition against agreements surrendering the promisor's right to engage in a certain profession,
obtain a discharge in bankruptcy, or initiate a divorce action-similarly manifest the law's concern that a person bargaining
away his liberty "be protected from himself, no matter how rational his decision or compelling the circumstances. ' 220 But in all
of these instances, the protected person is not a suspected felon,
and there is merit in granting relief from what may turn out to be
too harsh a bargain.
In criminal law, it is difficult to justify requiring a cooling-off
tone would defuse the warnings
by implying that the suspect had better not exercise his rights, or by delivering his
statement in a formalized, bureaucratic tone to indicate that his remarks were simply a
routine, meaningless legalism ....
After they had finished the advice they would solemnly intone, "Now you have been warned of your rights," then immediately shift to a
conversational tone to ask, "Now, would you like to tell me what happened?"
Id. at 1552.
218. Special Project, supra note 47, at 1615; Leiken, supra note 47, at 47-49. A three
year study of juvenile interrogation in St. Louis revealed that although most juveniles believe it is wise to have an attorney, in practice there is a "near absence of requests for
attorneys in actual juvenile interrogations. . . . [T]he reason might be that [the juveniles]
are too inhibited by the interpersonal and emotional characteristics of police interrogation
to do what they would otherwise believe to be in their best interest." T. GRisso, supra note
47, at 147. Similarly, Professor Stephens concludes that "[i]f the impact of Miranda is assessed strictly from the standpoint of its tangible effect on the interrogation process, the
decision may thus be regarded as an act of judicial futility." 0. STEPHENS, supra note 47, at
200. In Professor Stephens' own study of police attitudes and behavior in the KnoxvilleMacon area of Tennessee, he found a "high level of adherence to the letter of the decision
but very limited compliance with its policy objectives." Id. at 199.
219. For example, under the UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, 1974 AcT, § 3.502, 7A
U.LA. 134 (1985), a buyer "has the right to cancel a home solicitation sale until midnight of
the third business day after the day on which the buyer signs an agreement or offer to
purchase."
220. Kronman, Paternalismand the Law of Contracts,92 YALE L.J. 763, 775 (1983).
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interval before the suspect is allowed to respond to questioning.
There is no reason to insist that the suspect's decision to incriminate himself reflect mature judgment. Because mature judgment
implies distancing oneself from intimate desires and impulses, a
cooling-off period would allow those who are remorseful to have
second thoughts after they ponder the consequences of confession.22 1 A cooling-off period might make for more dispassionate
judgment, but, if we believe in the justness of our prohibitions and
punishments, what social value is promoted?
B.

Evaluating the Miranda Studies

The empirical studies contain valuable information about the
impact of Miranda on crime detection. Although these studies are
often cited for the proposition that Miranda has had little effect
on police efficiency, this characterization is inaccurate. This interpretation makes sense only in a historical context as a reply to the
hyperbolic assertions of those who predicted that installing a right
to counsel at the station house would maim criminal investigation.122 This perspective notwithstanding, the studies indicate that
Miranda took a toll.
The study that best measures Miranda's impact on crime detection was conducted in Pittsburgh, a medium-sized city with a
significant crime problem. 223 The researchers compared the difference in the confession rate before and after the Miranda decision
for all offenses investigated by the detective division: homicide,
robbery, burglary, auto larceny, and forcible sex. The results are
striking. Before Miranda, the detective division obtained confessions in 54.4% of all cases. After Miranda confessions were secured
in 37.5% of the cases, an overall decline of 31% .22' For robbery
and burglary cases, the drop is sharper, from a 60% confession rate
prior to Miranda to a 40% rate after Miranda. In homicide cases,
the decline in confessions is even steeper. 225 The researchers fur221. See Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 192 (1952); United States v. Carnigan, 342
U.S. 36, 39-41 (1951); People v. Claudio, 59 N.Y.2d 556, 453 N.E.2d 500, 466 N.Y.S.2d 271
(1983).
222. Seo generally Kamisar, On the Tactics of Police-ProsecutionOriented Critics of
the Courts, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 436 (1964) (discussing and critiquing the arguments of those
who strongly criticized the Warren Court's expansion of right for the criminally accused).
223. Seeburger & Wettick, Miranda in Pittsburgh-A Statistical Study, 29 U. Pi7r. L.
REv. 1 (1967).

224. Id. at 11.
225. Id. Measuring the impact on suspects as opposed to investigations, the researchers found that prior to Miranda about half of all suspects arrested for the aforementioned
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ther estimate that in "approximately 20% of all cases a confession
is probably necessary to obtain a conviction," and that in 25% of
the cases in which the suspect confessed, the confession probably
was necessary to obtain the conviction.2 2 6
A second study that measures the importance of confessions in
cases of serious crime was conducted in "Seaside City," a large
beach town in Los Angeles County. 227 The researchers examined
478 files, including both pre- and post-Miranda cases, and found
that interrogation was "essential" or "important" in 24% of the
cases and successful in producing incriminating matter in 67% of
the cases. 22 s There was only a slight post-Miranda decline in the
number of cases in which the suspect divulged fruitful information
or signed a confession. With regard to the "collateral" benefits of
interrogation, however, the study reports that "[t]he police were
found to be implicating fewer accomplices, clearing fewer crimes
and recovering less property through interrogation, and helping
'229
fewer suspects clear themselves.
Other studies, although not reflecting before and after data,
also demonstrate the importance of interrogation. A 1966 study of
interrogations in New Haven, Connecticut,2 3 0 a small city with a
low crime rate, reveals that questioning was successful in over half
(forty-nine of ninety) of the interrogations.23 ' Interviews with fiftyfive lawyers who defended seventy-five cases during early 1966 produced similar findings: in forty-nine of the seventy-five cases, the
police obtained incriminating statements.23 2 The researchers also
found that from 1960 to 1966 there appeared to be a decline of
"roughly 10 to 15 per cent. . . in the number of people who gave
felonies provided incriminating information, whereas after Miranda only about one third

provided such information. Id. at 12.
226. Id. at 15-16. Of those burglary and robbery files that indicated the outcome of the
case, defendants who had confessed were convicted 79% of the time, while defendants who
had not confessed were convicted 55% of the time. Id. at 20.

227. Witt, Non-Coercive Interrogationand the Administration of Criminal Justice:
The Impact of Miranda on Police Effectuality, 64 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 320 (1973).
228. Id. at 324-25.
229. Id. at 332.
230. Special Project, supra note 47, at 1519. In New Haven in 1956 there were only
arrests for 2 murders, 19 armed robberies and 9 forcible rapes. Id. at 1525. The authors
conclude that "interrogations play but a secondary role in solving the crimes. . . both because serious offenses are relatively infrequent and because the police rarely arrest suspects
without substantial evidence." Id. at 1613.
231. Id. at 1589.
232. Id. at 1589 n.186. Similarly, Professor Edward Barrett in his examination of criminal investigations in two cities reports that interrogation was both short and "surprisingly
productive of confessions and admissions." Barrett, supra note 133, at 45.
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some form of incriminating evidence over the entire time."2 ' The
researchers did not attempt to examine interrogation at the point
of arrest, before transportation to the police station, except to observe in a footnote that "[o]f the 33 suspects who were questioned
on the street, ten gave information. 2

34

At least one other study

notes the high incidence of incriminating statements secured immediately following arrest.2"5
Although most of the New Haven interrogations did not resemble the sophisticated and intense questioning alluded to in Miranda, the study identified seventeen instances where the police
intensively examined the suspects. These interrogations were "disproportionately successful";23 6 in eleven of the seventeen cases, the
concludes
interrogations yielded incriminating evidence. The study 237
that "[a]ggressive interrogation pays off in confessions.

All the studies suggest that suspects frequently waive their
rights. In the District of Columbia, two-fifths of the 260 defendants interviewed in a 1966-67 post-Mirandastudy said that they
had given statements to the police. 38 In "Prairie City," a "medium-sized city in central Illinois with a population of over
100,000, '' 239 the police in 1968 were "able to obtain a suspect's

waiver of his Miranda rights, ' ' as well as secure confessions, in almost half of the felony cases. 240
Most of the empirical investigations of Miranda were undertaken shortly after the decision was rendered. Hence, they fail, as
233. Special Project, supra note 47, at 1573.
234. Id. at 1533 n.40.
235. Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, supra note 195, at 1369. Of the 37 inculpatory statements obtained through police questioning, 19 (51%) were reported to have been elicited at
the time and place of arrest.
236. Special Project, supra note 47, at 1562. Low-key questioning also has its dividends as a recent study of police practices in Brighton, England demonstrates: "Of the sixty
suspects who were observed being interviewed, thirty five made admissions during the interview. A further four.., made admissions subsequently." B. IRviNG, supra note 178, at 149.
Irving concludes that interrogation, "as the art is currently practiced at Brighton, plays a
vital part in the criminal detection process." Id. at 152.
237. Special Project, supra note 47, at 1562. The study suggests that although interrogation yields incriminating evidence, it may be an unnecessary tool in many cases because of
the presence of other strong evidence of guilt. Id. at 1588. Such a judgment seems specula-

tive. The time between arrest and plea bargaining or trial may be lengthy; witnesses move
on, memories fade, evidence grows stale. A confession, however, retains its force, and when
supplemented with other evidence of guilt, can induce a plea of guilty or persuade a doubtful jury.
238. Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, supra note 195, at 1395.
239. Neubauer, Confessions in PrairieCity: Some Causes and Effects, 65 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY

240.

103 (1974).

Id. at 104.
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Professor Berger notes, "to conclusively tell us what Miranda
would mean if followed in letter and spirit, ' 24 1 or the impact if it
were extended. Probably, there would be a further reduction in
confessions, perhaps a significant one.

VII.

RESTORING THE BALANCE

The crucial concern for criminal procedure is the appropriate
bias to build into the rules. The rules can be constructed to favor
either side. Historically, there has been a continual movement between the two sides, at one end showing "an extreme solicitude for
the general security, leading to a minimum of regard for the individual accused" and at the other end showing an "extreme excessive solicitude for the social interest" in the individual, "leading to
a minimum of regard for the general security and security of social
institutions. ' 24 2 Because the rules function like a pendulum, at any
given time they are likely to be out of balance. Every generation or
so, they must be reset.
In evaluating the privilege against self-incrimination, we
should start with the premise that the privilege shelters the guilty.
As such, it exacts a costly price. This price is high not only because
our society, more than others, is plagued by violent crime, but also
because, as Sidney Hook reminds us, "justice in the individual case
consists as much in not letting the guilty escape as in not letting
the innocent suffer. 2 43 Although we are not prepared to adopt
rules that allow many innocent persons to be convicted, it does not
follow that there is merit in allowing individuals who have committed crimes to escape detection. Whenever a guilty person escapes
detection as a result of the privilege against self-incrimination, justice, in an important sense, is denied. This is true even if we accept
that we purposefully have adopted rules that are designed to allow
many guilty persons to go unpunished. An adversary system will
necessarily have some elements of chance to it, but to be just, the
system must be reliable not only in screening out the innocent but
in identifying the guilty. The rules must be fair, and the authorities must adhere to them, but such rules must be fashioned for the
244
larger purpose of finding the truth without too much harshness.
241.
242.

M. BERGER, supra note 90, at 131 (emphasis in original).
Pound, Criminal Justice and the American City-A Summary, in R POUND & F.

FRANKFURTER, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND: REPORTS OF THE CLEVELAND FOUNDATION
SURVEY OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND, OHIO

243.
244.

S. HOOK, COMMON SENSE AND THE
On this point, Sidney Hook adds:

FIFTH AMENDMENT

576-77 (1922).

132 (1954).
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Prior to Miranda,the constitutional restraints on police questioning had been treated as roughly analogous to the fourth
amendment prohibition against search and seizure. The fourth
amendment was not understood as forbidding all invasions of privacy, only "unreasonable" ones.2 4 5 Similarly, the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendement was interpreted to permit "mild
pressure"2 4 6 and to prohibit only police conduct likely to produce
an "involuntary" statement. The rules relating to obtaining confessions were a compromise among competing considerations, only
one of which was the protection of the suspect's interests in avoiding the discomforts of interrogation and escaping punishment. The
suspect's determination of whether cooperation would earn lenient
treatment, whether "fast talk" would divert suspicion, or whether
a steadfast refusal to answer questions might contribute to the
prosecutor's decision to "throw the book at him" was considered
an appropriate dilemma. That some suspects were no match for
the police, did not grasp their rights, and unwisely tried to talk
their way out of trouble was seen as a benefit to society, as long as
the police were not too harsh or the suspect under too great a
handicap. Pre-Miranda sentiment was reflected in the following
comment: "[T]here is no reason residing in the proposition that
persons charged with crime should be protected by law against
their voluntary admissions and confessions that they committed
2' 47
the crime with which they are charged.
[P]rinciples of evidence must be such as to make it much more than an even chance
that an innocent person will be acquitted and much more than an even chance that a
guilty person will be convicted. Otherwise we may as well toss a coin to decide the guilt
or innocence of a person in the dock.
Id. at 57.
245. More recently, the Supreme Court has described "the balancing of competing interests" as "the key principle of the Fourth Amendment." Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S.
692, 700 n.12 (1981) (quoting Justice White in Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 219
(1979)); see also Tennessee v. Garner, 105 S. Ct. 1694 (1985) (In determining whether apprehension of suspects by the use of deadly force satisfies the fourth amendment's reasonableness requirement, the extent of the intrusion on the suspect's rights must be balanced
against governmental interest in effective law enforcement.).
246. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 513 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
247. Ervin, A Decision Based on Excessive and Visionary Solicitude for the Accused,
5 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 125, 127 (1966). Another commentator similarly finds that judicial regulation of police interrogation has resulted in
the ascendancy of one consideration to a dominant position in the constitutional analysis-the protection of the suspect from unwise or improvident disclosures that may seal
his fate at trial. We have decided to attempt to simulate the situation that would exist
if the suspect has a lawyer present, by imposing on the police the duty of giving an
advice of rights and of taking statements only from those suspects who are unequivocally willing to give them.
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Before Miranda,therefore, the judicial inquiry focused on the
vulnerability of the suspect to interrogation pressure. It was assumed that the suspect ordinarily would participate in the investigation even though he had a right to refuse cooperation without
suffering any formal adverse consequences. The American attitude
toward interrogation was very similar to the English one as described by Lord Devlin in 1958:
[W]hile the English system undoubtedly does give the accused man the right
to be silent, it does nothing to urge him to take advantage of his right or even
to make that course invariably the attractive one. The balance on which the
English system works is that it combines the suspect's right to silence with
the opportunity to speak. . . . The dilemma in which the law puts the suspect-to 24speak
or not to speak, which is the safer,-seems to be a perfectly
8
fair one.

The Mirandamajority saw interrogation quite differently. The
Court viewed as unfair a suspect's inadequacies in confronting his
interrogators on an equal basis or in possessing the same fortitude
as other suspects. The Court wanted to place all of the participants
on equal ground. To accomplish this objective, the Court sought to
provide counsel to the suspect before the police could take advantage of the suspect's particular shortcomings. 249 Thus, with one
stroke, the Court boldly and improperly resolved the contradictions in the law of confessions by giving it a single fo250
cus-protection of the suspect.
Frey, supra note 174, at 732.
248. P. DEVLIN, supra note 185, at 59-61.
249. See Special Project, supra note 47, at 1614-15.
250. See Schulhofer, supra note 80, at 878 n.61 ("[B]y viewing the problem in fifth
amendment terms, the Court made clear... that protection against compulsory self-incrimination was not to be balanced against other legitimate social interests."); cf. T. ARNOLD, supra note 119, at 9 (The strength of our law is that it allows for the "dramatization
of all sorts of mutually inconsistent ideals.").
A biographer of Chief Justice Warren recently noted:
The problem with Warren's posture, of course, is that there is no compelling reason
why law enforcement officers and suspects should be on an equal footing. Although
interrogated persons are technically presumed to be innocent of potential charges, as a
practical matter a system of law enforcement has to presume potential guilt in detained suspects to justify their detention. Prosecuting authorities and persons charged
with crimes may be "equal" in court, but by definition they are not equal in the station
house, because law enforcement authorities are assumed to concentrate their efforts on
persons whom they think have some connection with a law-enforcement violation. Warren's application of the fairness principle in Miranda seemed to ignore the practical
necessity of giving law enforcement personnel some advantages in doing what society
has asked them to do.
G. WHITE, supra note 135, at 271. Earlier, in the same vein, Professor Kurland wrote:
The self-incrimination prohibition was read as a doctrinaire formula [in Miranda]
rather than a rule derived from historical necessity. In protecting the interest it
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In retrospect, Mirandaseems most understandable as an exaggerated response to the times rather than as an enunciation of a
natural right mined at last from the Constitution. Miranda was a
child of the racially troubled 1960's and our tragic legacy of slavery. It "was decided when blood was actually being spilled in the
streets. There were civil rights protests in the South and civil disorders in urban areas elsewhere. On national television, black
protesters [and their supporters] were bullied and beaten, black
rioters beaten and shot.

' 251

Mirandaitself was decided not only in

the shadow of the police practices exposed in Brown v. Mississippi25 2 and Chambers v. Florida25 3 but also in the more recent

past of the third degree applied particularly to southern blacks. To
many, the government itself seemed the cause of racism and poverty, and those apprehended by the police, armed robbers as well
as civil rights protesters, were seen as victims rather than offenders. Crime was not understood as the offshoot of individual will but
as a by-product of one's poverty or race or both. The goal was to
attack "root causes" rather than root out individual felons. President Johnson proposed a "Great Society" that would bring "an
end to poverty and racial injustice," in which both crime and police brutality would be banished. The country was ready to embark
on a grand future that would make up for this troubled past.
In this setting, Miranda stood out like a crown jewel. It spoke
to the disadvantaged and the discontented. It conferred status on
the accused. As such, it infused vitality into larger social and political movements, and it contributed to a climate of greater respect
for suspects.2 54 Miranda popularized the principle of warning one's
thought valuable, [the Court] tended to ignore any countervailing interests that society
properly demanded also be given consideration. It thus mandated more than it could
accomplish.
P. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT Xx-xxi (1970).
251. Caplan, Miranda Revisited (Book Review), 93 YALE L.J. 1375, 1382 (1984).
252. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
253. 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
254. Fred Graham provides an extensive analysis of Miranda'srole in this process:
[T]he Supreme Court might have done better in the long run if it had relied more in
Miranda on its role as constitutional teacher and propagandist, and had not attempted
to police the police through the compulsion of an inflexible threat to include evidence.
In retrospect, it appears that the most spectacular success of the Warren Court's due
process revolution has been to create a climate of fairness about criminal justice. The
Supreme Court's idealism proved contagious. Better people are now going into police

work, prosecutors' offices and public defender careers. . . .The heavy-handed treatment of defendants that had been almost an assumption of the system has given way to
a heightened and observable sensitivity among police, trial judges and appellate judges
of the importance of fairness . . . . [But] there is still reason to ask if the American
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adversary, of assisting him in defending himself, and of envisioning
the criminal not as a foreigner but as a neighbor down on his luck.
Criminals, Miranda suggested, were not wicked; they were
unfortunate.
Given this orientation, a thorough evaluation of Miranda
should look beyond the findings of empirical studies to what Thurman Arnold called the "symbols of government."2 55 Values, beliefs,
and emotions are implicated. Although some would alter their assessment of Miranda if research demonstrated that the decision
has influenced the conviction rate greatly, as opposed to marginally, most of us, I suspect, would hold to our views.25 6 As a symbol,
Miranda is too rooted in our attitudes toward authority to yield
easily to statistics.
For its supporters, Miranda is a gesture of government's willingness to treat the lowliest antagonist as worthy of respect and
consideration. They have a point. There is something attractive
about a legal system that insists that suspects have a right to re-.
fuse to answer police inquiries, that imposes on the police an obligation to communicate that right, and that provides counsel to the
indigent. The fifth amendment, as much as any constitutional provision, illustrates that ours is a limited government. It reflects an
historic distrust of authority. It reveals an unwillingness to wage
all-out war on crime, even heinous crime, lest other values be
demeaned.
But the root idea of Miranda, as well as earlier decisions such
2 57 and Escobedo v.
as Gallegos v. Colorado
Illinois, is quite different and more ominous. These decisions do more than suggest
that the government must be restricted in the means it employs in
criminal investigation. They impose a serious handicap on the government, which arises not merely from a desire to curb historic police abuses but also from an ambivalence about criminality itself
and a confusion concerning the purpose behind the rules of crimisystem of justice is not now suffering from an excess of due process.
THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 289 (1970).
255. T. ARNOLD, supra note 119, at iv.
256. When a researcher finds that his premises logically imply a conclusion he rejects
in his heart, he faces a quandary. He can adopt the conclusion or reject some previously
held premises, or he can abandon the whole enterprise. Most likely, he will find a way
around the unwelcomed conclusion. I do not recall an instance where a criminal law researcher has reported that he had been forced to come to some unwanted conclusion on
some fundamental question.
257. 370 U.S. 49 (1962).

F. GRAHAM,

258. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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nal procedure. The result blurs the traditional and theoretical distinction between the police and the criminal: one is useful, the
other noxious.
This blurring arose, in part, because we lost sight of the values
implicated by confession. Confession should be understood as an
endorsement of the prevailing order. When a person confesses
against himself, he speaks for the law. As Focault put it, the confessor's "personal condemnation [of himself] becomes a public affirmation of legal truth. '259 Felt confession is more than self-denunciation in the service of the establishment; it is an essential
prelude to readmission to the larger community that the confessor
has offended. It is the "ritual of inclusion.

' 26

To receive pardon,

the offender must acknowledge his deed. He cannot place the
blame elsewhere-on his upbringing, his poverty, his impulsivity,
his bad luck, or on some shortcoming in his accusers, his judges, or
the community at large. It is he himself who is at fault.
Because confession implicates social values, the existence of an
integrated, shared network of values is a precondition to the
proper operation of confession. 61 One does not confess to persons
considered unworthy, the "pigs," as the radical students called the
police during the 1960's; they are the representatives of an exploitative regime. When the existing order is widely considered unjust, offenders are encouraged to excuse their own misconduct and
accuse their accusers. Confession then, far from providing relief
from the pain of conscience or restoration to the community, becomes an "apparatus of personal and social degradation.

'262

When Miranda was decided in 1966, it was popular to see the
criminal as a type of victim; he was caught in the role assigned to
persons in his circumstances, a member of the underclass. One
spoke not of volition but of status or condition. The idea of individual guilt and remorse for wrongful deeds was out of fashion.
The causal factors of criminality were thought to lie outside the
individual, in the deeper, corrupt foundations of the society-the
so-called "root causes."
259. M. HEPWORTH & B. TURNER, supra note
CIPLINE AND PUNISH (1977)).

17, at 93 (summarizing M.

FOCAULT,

Dis-

260. Id. at 37.
261. See id. at 49 ("In a society where there is relative agreement over certain crucial
social values, confession may serve to reinforce and underline those values by confirming the
beliefs of persons in authority, symbolically restoring 'deviant' individuals to the community
and by socializing individuals in terms of anxieties about certain types of misconduct. Confession thus serves to buttress social values ... .
262. Id. at 37.
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This perspective on criminal process was perhaps but a special
case of "authority under seige" during the decade of the 1960's and
early 1970's, an understandable reaction to a history of racial
prejudice and perhaps to Vietnam and Watergate as well, but a
reaction in need of tempering nonetheless. It may be, as Professor
Francis Allen has recently suggested, that these attitudes toward
authority reflect "less a staunch individualism standing against the
coercions . . . of the state than a decline of confidence in public
purposes.''26 But "sooner or later," Allen correctly insists, we
must come to terms with social authority. Athough the notion of there being
an identity of social and individual interests is a chimera, there are social
purposes which, if realized, contribute to a fuller humanity and are indeed
the conditions for the achievement of human potentialities. Thus protection
of persons and property from unwarranted agressions [sic] by other members
26 4
of the community must be accomplished at some level of adequacy.

Just what that "level of adequacy" should be is hard to say.
The answer may turn more on our personal threshold of tolerance
for disorder and violence than the objective realities of crime at
any given time. Clearly, the amount of tolerance we, as a society,
have for violent crime will determine how the rules of the criminal
process are drawn-how much of an advantage is to be assigned to
the police in carrying out their duties of crime detection and apprehension of suspected offenders.
We know from the experience of other countries that the rules
can be drawn to make the police far more effective than they are in
this country; and there may be nations where the police in some
particulars operate under greater restraints than our own. A fair
state-individual balance can be achieved, it would seem, through a
variety of arrangements as long as it is conceded at the outset that
society has a stake in the outcome of police efforts to investigate
crime.
The Warren Court did have other options. Less potent
medicine was at hand. Requiring the government to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than by a preponderance
263. F. ALLEN, THE
PuRPOsE 88 (1981).

DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND SOCIAL

264. Id. More recently, Dean Allen has observed:
Among the central failures of liberal politics in our time has been its inability to take
the crime problem seriously and to associate itself with persuasive measures in response. . . . There is ample reason to assert that the fact of crime and the resulting
fears and outrage have contributed importantly to the deliberalization of American
society.
Allen, A Serendipitous Trek Through the Advance-Sheet Jungle: Criminal Justice in the
Courts of Review, 70 IowA L. REV. 311, 315-16 (1985).

1474

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1417

of the evidence, would have accomplished much. A higher burden
of proof would have encouraged further compliance with the law
and stimulated the government to find improved evidentiary methods for proving its adherence. In addition, the Court could have
added teeth to the voluntariness test by establishing per se rules
forbidding certain practices. Certainly, the totality of the circumstances test could have been modified to ban behavior that was
inherently coercive. A time limit for questioning suspects would
have been a strong prophylactic against police abuse and probably
would have attracted broad based support. Perhaps the presence of
neutral observers from the community to witness the interrogation
could have been encouraged.
The Court also could have mandated compliance with the
prompt arraignment statutes in effect in about three quarters of
the states. 65 In the federal system, the Court had fashioned the
McNabb-Mallory rule, derived from Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, to exclude confessions obtained during a
period of "unnecessary delay from the time of arrest to arraignment.

'2 66

Arguably, it had the authority to impose similar con-

straints on the states.
Beyond these possibilities, in 1968 Congress passed legislation
in response to Miranda that admirably blended the traditional voluntariness test with the fourfold warnings. Under the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, the federal trial judge was allowed to consider "all the circumstances surrounding the giving of
the confession," but he also was required "to take into consideration" whether the defendant had been "advised or knew that he
was not required to make any statement and that any such statement could be used against him," and "whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel," and "whether or not such defendant was without
the assistance of counsel when questioned and when giving such
confession.

21 67

These provisions, although never constitutionally

tested, remain today as a prospective alternative to the Miranda
solution.
Finally, current technology makes videotaped interrogations
265.

See LaFave, Detention for Investigation by the Police: An Analysis of Current

Practices, 1962 WASH. U.L.Q. 331, 332-33.
266. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332 (1943).
267. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1982). For a summary of state legislative responses to Miranda,
see MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 140.8 commentary (1975).

1985]

QUESTIONING MIRANDA

1475

practical. A rule mandating recording would confine extensive
questioning to those cases in which it mattered most and would
provide an accurate record by which the judiciary could evaluate
the police pressure on the suspect.
These proposals are consistent with other rules of criminal
procedure that impose a handicap on the government to temper its
zeal and effectiveness. Certainly, the dangers of uncontrolled government rival or exceed those of an uncontrolled populace. For this
reason we properly build into criminal investigation and the criminal trial some elements of chance. It is fear of overzealous prosecution that, in part, causes us to provide the accused with counsel
and to permit counsel a rather free hand in seeking an acquittal.
But to go further, as the Miranda Court did, and posit rules
designed to put the adversaries on equal terms in the investigative
phase is "too great a concession to egalitarianism. ' '1 68
It may be that at times the police and the criminal are adversaries "so well attuned to one another that they can and often do
reverse roles with minor shifts in the historical climate,"2 6 and it
may be, as a defense counsel has recently suggested, that "many
criminals think that the only difference between them and the police is that the police get health benefits and a pension. 2' 7 0 But
such should not be the case nor, as a matter of official policy,
should both sides be treated as possessing equal moral worth.
There is no neutral position. One must lean toward the government or subversion. With respect to criminal investigations, we
should not require the government to provide information that
would discourage a suspect's participation when the lawful character of the interrogation can otherwise be guaranteed; the concern
for accuracy runs too high and the public interest in identifying
and segregating dangerous persons is too great. The ultimate issue
is whether the government proceeded fairly, in a proper manner,
not whether the suspect knew his rights. When the interrogation is
noncoercive and the answers voluntary, the Constitution should be
satisfied.27 1 The privilege against self-incrimination is best under268. Friendly, supra note 175, at 711.
269. K ERIKSON, supra note 48, at 20.
270. Wishman, Evidence Illegally Obtained By Police, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1981, at
A25, col. 2.
271. It is clear, of course, that the Supreme Court has the power to overrule or modify
Miranda.A basic reexamination of Mirandawill occur if the government seeks a determination of the validity of § 701 of the Crime Control Act of 1968. See supra note 267. Because
that section provides for the admissibility of a confession "if voluntarily given," it is inconsistent with Miranda'srequirement of a warning to a suspect and the provision of counsel to
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stood as a denial to the government of the power to extract confessions forcibly and indecently, not as a denial of the value of confession. "[Pleaceful interrogation," Justice Harlan wisely reminded us
in his Miranda dissent, "is not one of the dark moments of the
272
law.,

indigent suspects who request counsel. See Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional
Determinations, 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 199 (1971) (discussing the constitutional validity of
§ 701).
If the Miranda rules are viewed not as constitutional commands, but as prophylactic
measures to achieve or secure constitutional commands, they may be susceptible to congressional reversal. In Michigan v. Tucker the Court held that Miranda warnings are "not
themselves rights protected by the Constitution," but only "prophylactic standards"
designed to "safeguard" the privilege against self-incrimination. 417 U.S. 433, 444-46 (1974).
In this regard, Miranda is similar to Mapp v. Ohio, holding that evidence obtained by unlawful search and seizure is simply a sanction for encouraging the police to observe the
fourth amendment "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects." 367 U.S. 643, 646 n.4 (1961); see also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967)
(holding that the presence of counsel at a post-indictment lineup necessary to promote fairness in the absence of legislative enactments designed to lessen the potential for

unfairness).
272.

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 517 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

